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DISCRETIONARY INTERLOCUTORY
REVIEW IN MISSOURI: JUDICIAL ABUSE OF
THE WRIT?*
DENNIS J. TUCHLER**
INTRODUCTION

Missouri's constitution distinguishes between appellate jurisdiction, which is subject to legislative regulation, and superintend-

ing control, which is not. Limited appeals are provided by statutes
which have been construed narrowly by Missouri's courts. Superin-

tending control includes authority to issue original remedial writs
(e.g., mandamus, certiorari, prohibition, habeas corpus, etc.) in a
theoretically limited class of cases, but in no event is there authority
to use the writs as substitutes for appeal. When a claim of trial court
error is made in a petition for a writ, however, the temptation is

always present to use superintending control to hear the claim and
correct the error, regardless of whether the error can be raised effectively on appeal. As a result, and especially in cases where no appeal
is available, writ-issuing authority has been used by Missouri's appellate courts to provide interlocutory review of attractive claims of
error.
The constitutional limits on judicial authority to effect appellate jurisdiction are violated by over-generous use of the writ. The
costs involved in extensive interlocutory review deserve recognition
and may outweigh any benefits derived from early review of claims
of trial error. This article generally opposes the use of writs to allow
interlocutory review of trial court error and proposes a narrower
* My thanks to my colleagues, Professors Dunne and Dunsford, to my former colleague,
Judge Simeone, and to a former student, Harry Wilson, who read the original manuscript

and offered comments and criticism. No doubt it will be apparent that I should have paid
more heed to their criticism.

** Professor of Law, St. Louis University, J.D., University of Chicago, 1963.
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scope for superintending control. First, however, a quick look will
be taken at the function and utility of appellate review, followed by
an examination of the supposed bases for issuing writs to correct
trial court error.
I.

SOMETHING ABOUT APPEALS

Everything a judicial system may do for the parties to an action
is done in a court of original jurisdiction. Completeness of disposition is limited only by the court's legal competence and the participants' capabilities. Once a full and fair opportunity to be heard on
all relevant issues has been afforded, and once all disputed issues
are decided in a manner respectful of law, nothing more is required.
Due process of law does not demand a correct decision or error-free
results.'
Nevertheless, it is generally felt that appeal from a final order
and from some interlocutory orders is necessary. Advocates of extensive appellate review or of review as a matter of right may be underestimating its costs and overestimating its utility. To the parties,
the justice of a result may be as much the function of efficiency as
of correctness. 2 To the state's citizens, increased appellate workload
may force choices between deteriorating quality in the judicial product, or increased expenditures for judicial personnel, buildings, and
research and clerical facilities. In part, this is because increased
opportunity for review would probably result in decreased judicial
time per case, unless there are more judges. If an appellate court is
to act collegially, there is a limit to the number of judges that sit
on that court. Hence, an increase in the number of appellate judges
must lead to an increase in the total number of appellate courts.
The alternative of making appeals discretionary would be of little
help, if each petition for review is to receive adequate attention.
Assurance of a fair trial by appellate review is limited by the
way decisional responsibility is allocated in a judicial system. Appellate courts may make and enforce rules and standards for a fair
trial, but trial fairness also depends upon essentially unreviewable
factors. For example, if alternative inferences or conclusions are
supportable in the evidence, the trier of fact may make its choice
1. McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684 (1894). The rules of res judicata suggest this is true.
See also Ross v. Moffit, 417 U.S. 600 (1973), indicating that appeal is not a requirement of
"due process of law."
2. In a way "efficiency" begs the question, because it depends upon the value one places
on authoritative, "correct" decision.
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not only out of wisdom, but also out of prejudice, "common knowledge," or whim. Such a choice will normally withstand review.'
When a trial judge has discretion in the administration of procedural rules, the exercise of discretion may be the result of the most
improper motives and have nothing to do with his attitude concerning the proper conduct of trial, but this decision normally stands if
it is of a type generally considered within the range of allowable
discretion.4 This is not to say that appeals should be expanded
because courts are imperfect or that appeals should be dispensed
with because they are often useless. It is only to suggest that appellate review does not function to assure fair trial and untainted results in most cases, except by the formal application of procedural
rules and standards, and by attempts at the correction of obvious
injustices.
If appellate courts correct "error," the extent to which appellate review should be available may depend in part on what "error"
means. A rough distinction may be helpful: it is often possible that
for a given dispute more than one decision or outcome is defensible.
More than one rule, or no currently available rule, may be applicable. An applicable rule may be applied in varying ways depending
on how it is interpreted or limited.' Any such decision may be called
lawful. The range of lawful decision with respect to any legal issue
may broaden or narrow, depending on higher authority. If there is
only one lawful decision, it may be called correct. Notice that a
3. Broad factual review may result in as many "wrong" as "right" decisions with no
way of telling which is which. Disputable fact decisions can be examined for arbitrariness
and, with less assurance, for compliance with requirements as to the quantum of proof. But
what catches the eye of the trial judge or .jury may differ from what attracts an appellate
judge, according to the predispositions of each. Who can say that the set of one or the other
will be more likely to produce a proper assessment of evidentiary weight? In rare cases, an
appellate court may be so convinced that injustice was done that it will find facts without
regard to the apparent foundation for the trial court's findings. See Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S.
536 (1965).
4. In the federal system, a combination of the "harmless error" limitation on review and
reluctance to review exercise of discretion have given the district courts effective control over
the development of the law in the area of discovery and other pretrial procedure.
5. Why this is true has been the subject of several articles and books. The case may be
"hard" for the application of a standard rule; the applicable rule may be of doubtful vitality
or it may be changing in form; or changes in the law have not yet filled out sufficiently to
limit the range of possible solutions to the problems supposedly covered by such changes. See
B.N. CARDOZO, The Nature of the JudicialProcess,reprinted in SELECTED WRITINGS OF BENJAMIN NATHAN CARDOZO 107 (M.E. Hall ed. 1947), especially Lecture I at 148. See also Dworkin, Hard Cases, 88 HARv. L. REV. 1057 (1975); Greenawalt, Discretion and JudicialDecision:
The Elusive Quest for the Fetters that Bind Judges, 75 CoLUm. L. REv. 359 (1975); Hart,
Positivism and the Separationof Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. Rv. 630-61, 669 (1958).
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lawful decision may be held incorrect (no longer lawful) on appeal.
The loser by a lawful decision who cannot appeal may feel unjustly
treated if an identical decision in another case is later found not
correct by an appellate court. Yet he is in no different position than
the person whose loss is affirmed on appeal by a rule that is later
changed to one by which he would have won. Justice does not
require that a victorious party lose his gain in such cases.
An unlawful-clearly wrong-decision imposes considerable
cost on the parties in terms of injustice, especially if it is not effectively reviewable. But it is impossible to provide interlocutory review only of such unlawful decisions, and it is difficult to design an
efficient, useful judicial system around a high expectation of judicial failure at the trial level. Such failure should be rare, even in the
case of minimally competent trial judges, when the judge is aided
by competent counsel. In some cases, the risk of unlawful decision
may be shared by the parties, as in the requirement that a bond be
filed before an interlocutory injunction is granted. But this does not
eliminate the costs and it may result in forcing a person to pay for
an interlocutory remedy to which he is clearly entitled anyway. The
decision as to how to deal with this problem is probably best left to
the agency charged by Missouri's constitution with the regulation
of appellate jurisdiction, the General Assembly.
Appeal, as a continuation of trial, came to England from Rome
by way of chancery and the ecclesiastical courts. Proceedings were
usually based on written evidence, and review was de novo. At law,
claims of error were on a petition for a writ-where the trial court
was of record, a writ of error-to Common Pleas or King's Bench.
Any error on the face of the record or on a bill of exceptions would
force a new trial.' In those days, law was deemed antecedent to the
cause and superior to the king and court-to be discovered, not
made. The emphasis has since changed. Centralized judicial systems are now admittedly sources of law, and review has shifted from
a focus on error-freedom (a somewhat circular notion if courts may
make law) to one on probable legal supportability of result.7 Appel-

late review is limited by the concept of "harmless error" and by
limitations on the scope and availability of review. When an appellate court affirms or reverses for "error," it may be doing more than
6. See 1 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW, 89-92 (King's Bench), 77-78
(Common Pleas) (1903).
7. Grounds for reversal have increased in number. See F. JMms, CIWL PROCEDURE §§
11.2-11.4 at 519-32 (1965).
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one thing, depending on its place in the judicial system' and its
authority to make summary disposition. If a trial court's judgment
is reversed, it may be because of an unlawful decision, or it may be
because the trial judge's decision is no longer lawful. In the latter
case, the appellate court may be abandoning or altering a formerly
correct rule or application. In both cases reversal is for "error." 9
There are better arguments for interlocutory review in some
cases than those based on assurance of fair trial and error-free results. For example, if interlocutory appeals are bad because they
protract trial, they may be much less obnoxious if they are limited
to matters which are sufficiently separate from the rest of the case

to be appealable without interrupting trial of the remaining issues.
The federal "final judgment" rule has been construed to allow ap-

peals from such judgments. A consequence of this, however, is that
the person aggrieved by such a judgment may lose his right to appeal on that issue if he waits until the entire case is ready for review.10 If appeal from final judgments is always justified, it should
also be justifiable from any judgment which settles matters in a way
which is not reversible after final judgment, such as an interlocutory
injunction against a continuing activity. Many states have provided
8. An intermediate appellate court may be limited constitutionally in its lawmaking
authority. This limitation is itself limited in a practical sense by the improbability of review
of its decisions. In Missouri, a case may be transferred to the supreme court from a district
of the court of appeals before or after judgment, by order of the supreme court. Mo. CONST.
art. V, § 10.
9. In Novak v. Kansas City Transit, Inc., 365 S.W.2d 539 (Mo. En Banc 1963), the trial
court had held that a wife had no cause of action for loss of her husband's consortium. The
trial judge's decision was firmly founded on precedent-Bernhardt v. Perry, 276 Mo. 612, 208
S.W. 462 (En Banc 1918). Novak held Bernhardt "clearly erroneous." 365 S.W.2d at 545. The
dissent posed the problem very nicely and made the interesting point that the "error" of
Bemhardt could be seen as cutting the other way, too; instead of giving a cause of action to
the wife, the court might as easily have held the end of Bernhardtwas the end of any claim
to relief for loss of consortium.
10. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2101, 2107 (1970).
11. Where the statute or rule allows interlocutory appeal in specific cases, the most
common orders from which such appeal is allowed are orders granting, denying, modifying,
continuing or refusing to grant, modify or continue a temporary injunction; orders appointing,
discharging, or modifying the authority of receivers; and orders requiring the transfer of some
property interest. Only Georgia provides for interlocutory appeals from orders granting, denying, or modifying temporary restraining orders. GA. CODE ANN. § 6-701 (Supp. 1971). In some
states, broad provisions for interlocutory appeals allow such appeals in any case where the
orders are "practically" final or where they threaten some change of position which may
obviate the value of an appeal at some later stage. See, e.g., ALAsKA Sup. CT. (Civ.) R. 23
(Supp. Sept. 1966); LA. CODE Civ. PRO.ANN. § 21-2-1(5) (1953); N.M. Sup. CT.R. 5(1) (1953);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-27 (1969); N.D. CENT.CODE § 28-27-02 (1974); ORE. REV. STAT. § 19.010
(1973); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-123 (1963); Wyo. Sup. CT. (Civ.) R. 72 (1953).
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appeals from practically final" or separable' 2 decisions, but Missouri has not.
A much less impressive argument for interlocutory review asserts that early settlement of important questions before the end of
trial will often shorten litigation by avoiding the need for appeal and
retrial. A provision for interlocutory appeal that responds to this
argument is 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). If a trial judge certifies that his
unappealable order "involves a controlling question of law as to
which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion" and
"that immediate appeal. . . may materially advance the ultimate
termination of the litigation," the court of appeals, in its discretion,
may permit an appeal from that order. Various states have adopted
similar provisions.' 3 In Katz v. Carte Blanche Corp.'4 the Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit interpreted section 1292(b) to allow
appeals from any matter which, if decided wrongly, could possibly
produce a ground for reversal on an appeal from final judgment. In
addition, when an appeal has been filed pursuant to section 1292(b),
trial may be stopped either by the trial judge or by the court of
appeals. It is quite possible that the claim of error on an allegedly
pivotal issue need never have been corrected, because the person
complaining of the error may win at trial, or because what seemed
5
pivotal at the time may be of minor significance when trial is over.'
Hence, interlocutory review under section 1292(b) may actually consume more time than it saves. One may wonder why Congress and
the states that adopted similar statutes did not merely provide for
general, discretionary interlocutory appeal.'"

12. Under Louisiana's "final judgment" rule, an appeal may be taken from any part of
a case which is decided "on the merits." LA. CODE CIr. PRO. ANN. art. 1841, 2083 (West 1961).
See also N.Y. Civ. PRAc. § 5701 (McKinney 1963).
13. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, § 308 (1969); K.S.A. § 60-212 (1963); 12 OKLA.STAT.
ANN. tit. 12, § 952 (Supp. 1974); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17 § 211-501 (Supp. 1975); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 27-305 (Supp. 1974); VT. R. APP. PRO. 5(b) (1958). With these compare HAWAn REv.
STAT. § 641-1 (Supp. 1974); ME. R. Civ. P. 72(c) (Supp. 1971); VT. R. APP. PRo. 5(a) (1974).
Only the appellate court has discretion in Alaska, Idaho, and Utah. ALASKA SUP. CT. (CIV.)
R. 23 (Supp. Sept. 1966); IowA R.C.P. 332 (1975); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2-2 (1953). Trial court
certification is enough if the issue can be decided without regard to any other issue in the
case in Florida. FLA. APP. R. 4.6(b) (1975). If the issue is "important" or so central as to justify
speedy authoritative decision, that is enough under the law of Hawaii, supra, Maine, supra,
and under DEL. SUP. CT. (Civ.) R. 20(2) (1972).
14. 496 F.2d 747 (3d Cir. 1974).
15. See Wright, The InterlocutoryAppeals Act of 1958, 23 F.R.D. 199 (1959).
16. See, e.g., MICH. GEN. CT. R. 806.
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II.

SUPERINTENDENCE AND APPEAL IN MISSOURI

The Supreme Court of Missouri, the districts of the Missouri
Court of Appeals, and the circuit courts are given appellate jurisdiction by the state's constitution, to the extent that the General Assembly confers it.17 A different section of the judicial article gives

these courts "superintending control over all inferior courts and
tribunals in their jurisdiction" and authority "to issue and determine original remedial writs.""8 Because the superintending authority is theoretically separate from appellate jurisdiction, and hence
free from all limitations on the latter, restrictions on authority to
hear appeals may be evaded by way of a writ. 9
17. Mo. CONST. art. V, §§ 3, 10, 13, 14 (as amended); ch. 512, RSMo (1973 Supp.).
Appellate jurisdiction is divided between the court of appeals and the supreme court in two
ways. Exclusive appellate jurisdiction is given the supreme court in specific cases listed in
article V, section 3: (1) cases involving the construction of the United States or Missouri
constitutions, the validity of a federal statute, treaty, or authority exercised under the law of
the United States; (2) cases involving construction of Missouri tax laws; (3) cases involving
title to Missouri state office; (4) appeals from convictions of an offense punishable by death
or life imprisonment; and (5) cases established by rule, subject to the constitution and
statute. All remaining initial appellate jurisdiction is given the districts of the court of
appeals and, when the appeal is from a court inferior to it, each circuit court. The supreme
court has secondary appellate (transfer) jurisdiction in cases in the initial appellate jurisdiction of the court of appeals. The supreme court may take the case from the court of appeals
before or after decision in the latter court, and it may be required to take the case from the
court of appeals if the district in which the case is properly filed certifies it to the supreme
court, or if, after decision, a dissenting opinion states that the decision conflicts with other
appellate decisions. The authority of the supreme court to transfer before opinion has been
held to include the authority to allow appeals directly to the supreme court even though they
are in the initial appellate jurisdiction of the court of appeals. In re M.K.R., 515 S.W.2d 467
(Mo. En Banc 1974).
18. Mo. CONST. art. V, § 4. See also Mo. CONST. art. V (1820).
19. Issues within the "exclusive" jurisdiction of the supreme court may be heard and
decided by the court of appeals when a writ is sought. In State ex rel. City of Mansfield v.
Crain, 301 S.W.2d 415 (Spr. Mo. App. 1957), prohibition was issued to prevent a circuit court
from granting an injunction. The case raised issues that would have placed an appeal from
such an injunction in the exclusive jurisdiction of the supreme court. The explanation for this
apparent anomaly was:
The issuance of original remedial writs is not an appellate process, hence limitations solely on the appellate jurisdiction, as such, do not in themselves affect the
supervisory process, which represents the application of judicial policy.
Id. at 418. Had the circuit court dismissed the petition for an injunction for failure to state a
cause of action (i.e., want of "equity jurisdiction"), resting its dismissal on state or federal
constitutional grounds, the plaintiff could have either sought mandamus from the court of
appeals to prevent dismissal, or appealed the dismissal to the supreme court. Cf. State ex
rel. Smith v. Greene, 494 S.W.2d 55 (Mo. En Banc 1973).
Superintending authority has also been exercised to review orders that are unreviewable
by statute. In Stroder v. State, 522 S.W.2d 77 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1975), an appeal from a
revocation of parole was denied because of the absolute bar of section 549.141, RSMo 1969.
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According to State ex rel. Auto Finance Co. v. Landwehr, 0 "the
power of supervisory or superintending control. . . has its origin in
the power exercised by King's Bench in England.""1 But history
offers little explanation or justification for the modern issuance of
writs to review trial court decisions. In the England to which the
Landwehr court referred, there were competing systems of law and
competing sources of judicial authority. Prohibition, the writ normally associated with the control of jurisdiction, was used by the
central common law courts22 to extend royal judicial power at the
expense of non-royal authority," and to prevent encroachment by
equity24 and the law merchant2" on the domain of the common law.
The latter use of the writ has been rendered obsolete by the unification of all judicial authority in a single judicial system. In the
United States, the closest thing to a conflict between legal systems
is that between state and federal courts. Neither prohibition nor
mandamus is used by the courts of either system to limit or prevent
the exercise of jurisdiction over a case by a court of the other system;" appeal and collateral attack suffice.
When Missouri entered the Union, review of judicial decisions
at law was by writ of error on the record of the trial court or on a
bill of exceptions. The writ issued of course 27 from the supreme court

to circuit courts, and from circuit to county and justice of the peace
courts. Appeals were allowed by statute to the supreme court and
However, the court stated that "review in such cases is available but must be by writ of
prohibition or habeas corpus." Id. at 82.
Granting a writ of habeas corpus may or may not be reviewable. CompareState ex reL.
Taylor v. Blair, 357 Mo. 586, 210 S.W.2d 1 (En Banc 1948), with State ex reL. Heitt v.
Simmons, 112 Mo. App. 535, 87 S.W. 35 (St. L. Ct. App. 1905).
Mandamus has been used to circumvent the very narrow provision for appeal by the state
from dismissal of a criminal case. State ex rel. Harris v. Laughlin, 75 Mo. 358 (1892); State
ex rel. Corcoran v. Buder, 428 S.W.2d 935 (St. L. Mo. App. 1968).
20. 229 Mo. App. 1221, 71 S.W. 144 (St. L. Ct. App. 1934). The case dealt with the
superintending authority of a circuit court.
21. Id. at 1244, 71 S.W.2d at 145.
22. See 1 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 74-78, 87-95 (1903).
23. See Adams, The Writ of Prohibitionto Courts Christian, 20 Mn N. L. REv. 272
(1936).
24. See 1 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW, 203-11 (1903).
25. See 5 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW, 129-48 (1924).
26. Although the Supreme Court of the United States has exercised superintending
control of a sort over state courts with respect to criminal procedure, the pretext was not
jurisdictional. See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). It is doubtful that state courts
may issue any coercive orders with respect to federal proceedings. See Donovan v. City of
Dallas, 377 U.S. 408 (1964); Tarble's Case, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 397 (1871).
27. Practice in Supreme Court, §§ 1, 3, RSMo 1835.
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the circuit courts in a limited number of cases.28 In 1891, appellate
jurisdiction of the supreme court was expanded to include all final
judgments, 2 and the writ of error became merely an alternative
appellate route to be taken after time for appeal had run.3 1 Still, the
writ of error was held to be an original writ, and the formal distinction was kept alive 31 until 1943, when it was abolished by statute in
civil cases.32 In 1947 it was held that the constitutional authority to
issue "original writs" did not allow the courts to issue a writ of
33
error.
Interlocutory appellate review was first allowed in 1891.11 The
statute allowed appeals from (1) final judgments and orders after
final judgment, (2) orders granting a new trial, (3) orders in arrest
of judgment, (4) orders dissolving an injunction, and (5) interlocutory judgments in actions of partition which determine the rights of
the parties. The list was enlarged in 1895 to include orders refusing
to revoke or modify an interlocutory order appointing a receiver.3 5
Orders in arrest of judgment ceased to be a ground for interlocutory
review in 1943,31 but otherwise the provision for interlocutory relief
has not changed since 1895.31 No interlocutory appeal is allowed
from the grant, denial, or modification of interlocutory injunctions
or temporary restraining orders.
The final judgment rule has been construed quite narrowly in
Missouri. A judgment is not final unless it is a complete disposition
of all matters before the court, regardless of whether the matters to
be disposed of are purely formal or whether the non-final order
effectively settles all matters in dispute. 38 A "non-final" decision
28. Appeals to the supreme court were allowed in equity cases, criminal cases, and suits
to declare the plaintiff not a slave. Practice in Chancery, Art. VI § 11, RSMo 1835; Practice
and Proceedings in Criminal Cases, Art. VIII § 1, RSMo 1835; Freedom, § 15, RSMo 1835.
Other statutes provided for appeals to circuit courts.
29. Mo. Laws 1891, at 70.
30. Id.
31. See Fidelity Trust Co. v. Mexico S.F. & P. Traction Co., 170 Mo. 487, 194 S.W. 52,
54 (1917), citing St. Louis v. Butler, 201 Mo. 396, 99 S.W. 1092 (1907), for the proposition
that a petition for a writ of error was, unlike appeal, an original civil suit.
32. Mo. Laws 1943, at 353, § 125.
33. State ex rel. McPike v. Hughes, 355 Mo. 1022, 199 S.W.2d 405 (En Banc 1947).
34. Mo. Laws 1891, at 70.
35. Mo. Laws 1895, at 91.
36. Mo. Laws 1943, at 353, § 126.
37. § 512.020, RSMo 1969.
38. Proctor v. Jacobs, 472 S.W.2d 609 (Mo. 1971); Brown Supply Co. v. J.C. Penney
Co., 505 S.W.2d 463 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1974); Seiter v. Tinsley, 479 S.W.2d 217 (Mo. App.,
D. St. L. 1972).
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may end the matter completely, have preclusive effect, and still be
unappealable, as when a case is dismissed for want of personal
jurisdiction-whether for purely formal reasons, or because of more
serious limitations on service of process. 9 Such a decision is never4
theless res judicata on the issue of personal jurisdiction. 1

There is no appeal if it is not provided by statute. 41 The Mis-

souri constitution also prohibits the judiciary from making rules
which may "change . . . the law relating to . . .the right of appeal."4 2 This ought to indicate that the courts may also not narrow
or expand that right through the use of original writs.
Ill.

SUPERINTENDING CONTROL BY PRODAMUS
(OR IS IT MANDHIBITION?)

The writs commonly associated with superintending control in
Missouri are certiorari, mandamus, and prohibition. These writs
may issue, in the court's discretion, on original petitions to stop,
prevent, or force certain action by judges. Certiorari is normally
used after proceedings to be reviewed are completed, in order to
provide judicial review where none is allowed by statute. It is not
normally an interlocutory review device and will not be considered
here.
Mandamus and prohibition are formally separate and distinct
remedies, each treated by a separate Supreme Court Rule.43 In
theory, mandamus compels an affirmative duty, 44 and prohibition
39. Continent Foods Corp. v. National-Northwood, Inc., 470 S.W.2d 315 (Spr. Mo. App.
1971); Color Process Co. v. Northwest Screenprint Co., 417 S.W.2d 934 (Mo. 1967). Cf. Frank
v. Sinclair Refining Co., 363 Mo. 1054, 256 S.W.2d 793 (1953). Frank, a venue case, has been
cited for the proposition that dismissal for want of jurisdiction is not appealable because it
does not adjudicate the merits. See Heard v. Estate of Frye, 336 S.W.2d 729, 730 (Spr. Mo.
App. 1960); State ex rel. Anonymous v. Murphy, 354 S.W.2d 42, 43 (K.C. Mo. App. 1962).
40. Healy v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe R.R., 287 S.W.2d 813, 815 (Mo. 1956) (which
treated all jurisdictional issues as equivalent for the purposes of preclusion).
41. Kansas City Power and Light Co. v. Kansas City, 426 S.W.2d 105, 107 (Mo. 1968).
42. Mo. CONST. art. V, § 5. Nonetheless, Supreme Court Rule 81.06 has expanded the
availability of appeal to cases in which there are multiple claims where there is a decision as
to one but not all of them. The rule gives finality to judgments on verdicts where one of several
claims is tried separately to a jury, and on judgments in the case of separate. trial before a
judge on one of several claims, where the judge certifies the judgment as final. The Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure contain a similar apparent violation of the "final judgment" rule in
Rule 54(b). But the more practically oriented interpretation of the federal "final judgment"
limitation on appeals makes it easier to accept the federal rule. See C.A. WRIGHT, LAW OF
FEDERAL CouRTs 452-58 (2d ed. 1970).
43. Mo. Sup. CT. R. 84.22-.25 (apply to all original writs); Mo. SUP. CT. R. 94 (mandamus); Mo. Sup. CT. R. 97 (prohibition).
44. J.L. HIGH, A TREATISE ON EXTRAORDINARY LEGAL REMEDIES 138-42 (2d ed. 1884).
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prevents judicial action.45 High's treatise states that mandamus will
be used to set an inferior court in motion when action has been
refused or delayed, but that it will not direct the way in which the
inferior court is to act." If the inferior court acts without or "in
excess of" jurisdiction,47 the proper remedy is prohibition. This
clear distinction between positive and negative remedies has the
same utility as that between mandatory and prohibitory injunctions. As a result, the writs have become functionally interchangeable in Missouri. Both prohibition and mandamus have issued to
prevent the striking of a claim."4 Prohibition has issued to prevent
the denial of a motion" and to prevent taking action other than that
specified in the writ." Given their interchangeable use, it may be
more sensible to call them both by one name-writ of supervision,
or prodamus, or mandhibition-and treat both in the same procedural rule.
The procedure for obtaining a writ is outlined elsewhere" and
will be given short treatment here. Although the practices are not
uniform throughout the Missouri courts, all four appellate courts"
summarily dismiss most petitions within a few days of their filing.
The supreme court hears argument for permanent or peremptory
relief en banc, whereas the districts of the court of appeals hear and
decide by panel. After the petition is filed, accompanied by written
"suggestions" (i.e., a brief) and exhibits, and if the petition seems
in order and appears to raise a substantial issue, the supreme court
will send a letter to the respondent judge, informing him that if he
45. Id. at 603-60.
46. Id. at 138-42.
47. High's examples of "excess of authority" include: granting a new trial in a criminal
case where judgment was entered in a previous term of court, and no statute authorizes the
grant; unauthorized exercise of appellate jurisdiction at the instigation of nonparties; enforcement of a money judgment or writ pending appeal; imposition of the death penalty in a noncapital case; or gross violation of legal limits in a criminal case "involving a question of life
and death." Id. at 624-25, 632.
48. Id. at 623-24.
49. See State ex rel. Wells v. Mayfield, 365 Mo. 238, 281 S.W.2d 9 (En Banc 1955);
State ex rel. Smith v. Greene, 494 S.W.2d 55 (Mo. En Banc 1973). Mandamus has also issued
to compel a court to dismiss a cause and to dissolve or vacate an injunction. Ruddy v.
Coming, 501 S.W.2d 537 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1973); State ex rel. National Junior College
Athletic Ass'n v. Luten, 492 S.W.2d 404 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1973); State ex rel. House v.
White, 429 S.W.2d 277 (K.C. Mo. App. 1968).
50. State ex rel. Laclede Gas Co. v. Godfrey, 468 S.W.2d 693 (St. L. Mo. App. 1971).
51. State ex rel. Johnson v. Green, 452 S.W.2d 814 (Mo. En Banc 1970); State ex rel.
Schwarz v. Buder, 315 S.W.2d 867 (St. L. Mo. App. 1958).
52. Mo. Bar C.L.E., Appellate Practice and ExtraordinaryRemedies (2d ed. 1974).
53. The Supreme Court of Missouri and the districts of the Missouri Court of Appeals.
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does not comply with the prayer in the petition, a preliminary or
alternative writ (depending on the formal relief sought) will issue.
A preliminary writ is the equivalent of an order to show cause why

final relief ought not to be granted. If the St. Louis district of the
court of appeals has not denied the petition summarily, an informal
hearing is held before the panel, which then decides whether the
petition should be denied or a preliminary writ should issue. Before
that, the respondent judge has been told (usually by telephone) to
stop all proceedings pending the decision on the petition. Issuance
of a preliminary writ is a decision that the petition raises a substantial matter and that the court is ready to exercise its discretion in
more than a summarily negative way.
The parties to these proceedings are nominally the relator (i.e.,
the petitioner) and the respondent judge whose acts are called into
question. The respondent usually is represented by counsel of the
real opponent of the writ, the party who benefited by the
complained-of act." The preliminary and final writs are addressed
to the nominal respondent. 5
54. In some cases, the respondent judge is the real party opponent, and he may have
to hire counsel because the prosecuting or circuit attorney will not represent him. This was
the case in State ex rel. Lucas v. Schaaf, No. 35,651 (1974) filed in the St. Louis district,
Missouri Court of Appeals, on October 30, 1973. The petition was denied after argument and
submission (without opinion) on September 10, 1974. The relator had been committed to the
Missouri State Hospital in Fulton, Missouri, by orders of the circuit court for St. Louis
County as a sexual psychopath under § 202.700, RSMo 1969. Thereafter, his status was
changed to that of an outpatient without approval of the circuit court that had ordered his
commitment. The circuit judge threatened to order his return to inpatient status, and the
relator sought and was denied prohibition against the entry of that order.
55. The exercise of superintending control and the decision of an appeal both often
result in an order to the trial judge-by writ, if superintending control is exercised, and by
mandate, if it is not. The best and clearest description of the distinction between superintending control and appellate jurisdiction was given by the Supreme Court of Missouri in State
ex rel, T.J.H. v. Bills, 504 S.W.2d 76 (Mo. En Banc 1974). T.J.H. was a juvenile offender
charged with the possession of marijuana. The juvenile court had waived jurisdiction over
the juvenile and had thereby subjected him to regular criminal process. The reason for the
waiver was not stated in the waiver order. T.J.H. appealed, but the appeal was denied
because the waiver order was not a final judgment. His appeal would lie from his conviction
in the circuit court. In re T.J.H., 479 S.W.2d 433 (Mo. En Banc 1972). The juvenile then
sought prohibition to prevent the magistrate from holding a preliminary hearing and from
binding him over for trial in the circuit court. Prohibition was granted by the Kansas City
district of the Missouri Court of Appeals, 495 S.W.2d 722 (1973), but the case was transferred
to the supreme court. Over two years from the failure of the first appeal, T.J.H. won his point
in State ex rel. T.J.H. v. Bills, 504 S.W.2d 76 (Mo. En Banc 1974). Of course, the supreme
court had to distinguish its earlier refusal of appellate jurisdiction:
The issuance of a writ of prohibition is not an appellate process. A proceeding in
prohibition is distinct and independent of the original action. It is substantially a
proceeding between two judicial authorities, a superior and an inferior, and is a
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The issuance of preliminary relief produces a new round of often
repetitive pleadings, briefs, and motions. Argument over the final
writ is, to a large extent, a polished rehash of everything that has
gone before, subject to any changes which the court's reaction to
the petition may have occasioned. Final judgment produces a writ
which may grant petitioner's request, or provide less or much more
than the petitioner sought." Normally only the issuance or denial
of a final writ (as opposed to a preliminary writ) is accompanied by
57
a written opinion.
LIMITATIONS ON WRrr-IssuING AUTHORITY

IV.

There are, at least in theory, two doctrinal limitations on writissuing authority. First, a writ will not issue if there is an adequate
alternative remedy. Second, a writ will issue only to cure certain
specific types of "error." However, because of judicial willingness to
review attractive claims of error by writ, these limitations have been

distorted to the point where they no longer constitute serious barriers to the use of writs as an appellate device.
A.

Adequacy of Alternative Remedies

Superintending control is limited to cases in which there is no
means by which the superior judicial authority exercises its superintendence over
the inferior authority to keep it within the bounds of its lawful jurisdiction ...
There is no danger, as respondent fears, that our holding that a writ of prohibition
is available to relator in this cause will nullify our decision in In re T.J.H., supra,
by making available through use of the extraordinary writs appeal which we there
foreclosed. In the case at hand a writ of prohibition is available because relator has
shown that the magistrate court is without jurisdiction to proceed further in the
case. The juvenile court's order relinquishing jurisdiction did not set forth findings
stating the basis of its decision and consequently was not sufficient to transfer
jurisdiction to the magistrate court. The writ of prohibition goes to the sufficiency
of the order to transfer, not to its correctness.
504 S.W.2d at 78-79.
The "sufficiency" as opposed to the "correctness" of the order was judged according to the
requirements of Kent v. U.S., 383 U.S. 541 (1965), hardly a decision on Missouri juvenile
court jurisdiction. The juvenile court order was insufficient for formal reasons. If there were
a jurisdiction requirement, it was in the making of findings under § 211.071, RSMo 1969, not
their statement on a waiver order. 504 S.W.2d at 79-82. See Judge Pritchard's dissent to the
court of appeals decision, 495 S.W.2d at 734, for a clearer look at the problem.
56. See, e.g., State ex reL Boll v. Weinstein, 365 Mo. 1179, 295 S.W.2d 62 (En Banc
1956).
57. It is at least arguable that Mo. CONST. art. V, § 12 (as amended), and § 477.030,
RSMo 1969, require that at least in the grant of preliminary and final writs an opinion be
published. Final relief has been granted without opinion. See General Motors Corp. v. Nangle, No. 34,600 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1972).
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adequate alternative remedy." One such remedy, of course, is appeal from an adverse judgment. Another might be a motion before
the allegedly erring court to set aside or reconsider the court's alleged error." It would be proper to require exhaustion of remedies
in the trial court before alternative remedies are deemed "inadequate," but no such rule of exhaustion exists."0
Appeal may be "inadequate" for a variety of reasons. An appeal
may not be available until too late to cure the effect of an erroneous
order or judgment. Appeal may be slow and expensive. Moreover,
only an "aggrieved" party may appeal.61 The appellant may be required to post a bond to stay or interrupt execution of the judgment.
Because of the relative speed and inexpensiveness of superintending
control, an appeal may always be inadequate where the alleged error
is in the issuance of an interlocutory order, especially if the error
renders the remaining proceedings useless to either party." If, on the
other hand, subsequent events at trial may cure the alleged
error-e.g., the aggrieved party's ultimate victory at trial, then review by writ may result in needless delay. In addition, if the normal
superiority of review by writ renders any slower, more expensive
mode of review inadequate, then all appeals would be presumptively inadequate, and this limitation on the exercise of superintending control would be effectively destroyed.
Because neither the state nor the federal constitution requires
that judicial decisions be appealable, 3 the inadequacy of an appellate remedy is not, by itself, a sufficient justification for using superintending control to review error. At least, no one has suggested that
a proper function of superintending control is to fill lacunae in legis58. Mo. Sup. CT. R. 84.22.
59. If the alleged error is in the appointment of a receiver, the aggrieved party may
move to modify or rescind the order. Refusal of such a motion is appealable. § 512.020, RSMo
1969.
60. In State ex rel. Siegel v. Strother, 365 Mo. 861, 289 S.W.2d 73 (En Banc 1956), the
error was misjoinder of issues, which could have been attacked by a motion to sever rather
than to dismiss. No such motion was required, nor was the question of the possible utility of

such a motion considered.
61.

The appellant must have a "pecuniary interest" in reversal. This rule is particularly

hard on a defendant in a multiple-defendant case, when another defendant escapes by way
of dismissal. The remaining defendant is not "aggrieved" by the dismissal. White v. Kuhnert,

207 S.W.2d 839 (K.C. Mo. App. 1948). Could he have sought prohibition against the dismissal?
62. As, for example, when the alleged error is in refusal, at the outset, to dismiss for
want of jurisdiction of the subject matter. Such lack of jurisdiction is usually not waivable
and may be raised by either party on appeal.
63. See authorities cited notes 1 and 41, supra.
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lative provision for appeals.

Early Missouri cases indicate that the inadequate remedy limitation was once taken seriously, 4 but by 1907 it appeared that appeal would be inadequate whenever the claim of error was sufficiently attractive." In Dahlberg v. Fisse6 the supreme court held
that the necessity of going through trial and complying with an
order for accounting was too burdensome, rendering the appellate
remedy inadequate. In State ex rel. Uthoff v. Russell 7 the "expense,
vexation and annoyance" of going through trial justified issuing a
writ. Appeal has been held inadequate because the appellant would

have to file a supersedeas bond!68 That is, superintending control is
a means of evading the protection given the appellee by the bond
during a stay of execution. In State ex rel. Associated Transport

Corp. v. Godfrey 9 prohibition was granted to prevent the circuit
court from proceeding with a garnishment in aid of execution. Appeal was available from the judgment of execution on the garnishment, but that was irrelevant because "it has been consistently held
that prohibition is the proper remedy to prevent a court from making an order which it has no jurisdiction to make."10 Finally, in State
ex rel. Pruitt v. Adams7 prohibition issued to prevent entry of an
appealable judgment.
64. See Bowman's Case, 67 Mo. 146 (En Banc 1872); State ex rel. Morse v. Burkhardt,
87 Mo. 533 (1885). On the other hand, the court did hear and decide one of the claims of error
in Bowman's Case on the merits-against the petitioner.
65. In State ex rel. Sullivan v. Reynolds, 209 Mo. 161, 107 S.W. 487 (En Banc 1907),
for example, both appeal and supersedeas were available.
66. 328 Mo. 213, 40 S.W.2d 606 (1931). Prohibition was sought to prevent enforcement
of a referee's award of an accounting and damages. The matter was still to be litigated to
conclusion before the trial judge.
67. 210 S.W.2d 1017 (St. L. Mo. App. 1948).
68. State ex rel. Templeton v. Seehorn, 208 S.W.2d 789 (K.C. Mo. App. 1947). Prohibition was sought to prevent modification of a judgment which required the relator to deposit
money into court. The court indicated that appeal would have taken longer than review by
writ. Id.at 794.
69. 464 S.W.2d 776 (St. L. Mo. App. 1971).
70. Id. at 779.
71. 500 S.W.2d 742 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1973). The requirement of an inadequate
appellate remedy vanishes completely when the issue presented by the petition is of "public
importance." For a dubious application of this exception, see State ex rel. Lucas v. Moss,
498 S.W.2d 289 (Mo. En Banc 1973), where the issue was whether videotaped depositions
could be used as evidence. In Giacopelli v. Clymer, 521 S.W.2d 196 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1975),
prohibition was sought to determine whether the trial judge could prohibit the performance
of a "ministerial duty," the administration of an oath of office. The "public importance" of
a claim to public office justified the exercise of superintending control even though, had the
trial judge entered his order prohibiting administration of the oath, an appeal could have been
taken.
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It may be worthwhile to turn the question of inadequacy around
and look at the utility to the parties of review by writ. A good place
to start is Broglin v. St. Louis Southwestern Ry. ,72 in which a widow
sued a railroad for the wrongful death of her husband, who was
killed when his truck collided with defendant's train. Because Missouri placed an upper limit on wrongful death recovery of $50,000,
Mrs. Broglin sued under the law of Texas, where the collision occured. Other choice-of-law issues that could have arisen included
the existence and effect of the husband's contributory negligence
and the distribution of any recovery among the decedent's relatives.
Suit was filed on December 12, 1970, and defendant's motion to
strike reference to Texas' wrongful death law was granted on May
22, 1972. It was in the plaintiff's interest to prosecute or settle the
case in order to avoid substantial devaluation of any potential recovery by the current inflation. Despite this, she sought mandamus
from the court of appeals to compel vacation of the order granting
the motion to strike. An alternative writ issued August 3, 1972,
which was made permanent on July 10, 1973.13 A motion for rehearing was filed and denied, but a dissent from the denial of rehearing
caused the case to be transferred to the supreme court on August 8,
1973. Argument was heard by the supreme court en banc, and the
issuance of the writ was affirmed by opinion on June 24, 1974. 74 The
case thus proceeded to trial, but only after 25 months had passed
since the motion to strike was granted. What makes this case appealing for the purpose of this part of the discussion is that the writ
served no purpose other than to increase the supreme court's and
the court of appeals' workload and to produce a possibly unnecessary choice-of-law decision. Had the order to strike remained in
effect, and had the case gone to trial, the choice-of-law issue regarding limitation of damages would not have been a basis for appeal
had the jury returned with a defendant's verdict or a verdict of less
than $50,000. In that event, the choice-of-law issue would be relevant only if the case were to be sent back for trial on the issue of
damages for reasons that had nothing to do with choice-of-law. The
plaintiff could have asked the trial court to allow the jury to make
a special finding of actual damages, so that if the jury found damages in excess of $50,000, the appellate court could decide the
72.

No. 20,087F (Cir. Ct. St. L. 1970).

73.
74.

No. 34,871 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1973).
State ex rel. Broglin v. Nangle, 510 S.W.2d 699 (Mo. En Banc 1974).
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choice-of-law issue without sending the case back for retrial. Given
the amounts involved, whatever the verdict, appeal from final judgment was highly likely.
In State ex rel. Pulliam v. Swink75 a defendant sought prohibition to prevent a circuit judge from striking an affirmative defense.
The motion to strike was granted because the defendant had refused
to answer interrogatories on the ground of possible selfincrimination. The petition, filed August 18, 1972, was granted temporarily by the court of appeals on September 20, 1972, and permanently on May 7, 1973. A motion to transfer to the supreme court
was granted on December 10, 1973, and the court of appeals' decision was affirmed September 9, 1974,76 two years after the defendant
first sought the writ. Had the writ not issued and the motion to
strike stood, the defendant might have won, rendering the issue
moot unless the plaintiff won his appeal. Now that the writ issued,
the plaintiff might still win, again rendering the writ irrelevant. Had
the writ not issued and the defendant lost, the order striking his
defense may or may not have been the only ground for appeal; and
it may have required retrial, unless the evidence was such as to
warrant the appellate court's entry of judgment for the defendant.
In any case, it is not clear that other grounds for appeal would not
arise despite the granting of the writ. Issuing the writ could not have
saved much time and may have wasted it.
Although there are instances where interlocutory review by writ
can be quite helpful to a party, even if the relief sought is denied,7"
there are significant, but often overlooked, costs to both the parties
and the judicial system itself. If a petition for review by writ is to
be granted or denied with opinion, for example, the petitioner can
assume a wait of from six months to a year. The delay does not work
hardship on the parties alone. Deciding petitions for writs can take
at least as long as deciding any other appeal. If writs are given
expedited treatment, then decision in other cases must be delayed.
75. 514 S.W.2d 559 (Mo. En Banc 1974).
76. Id.
77. The most notable examples are petitions for mandamus to compel a trial judge to
proceed with a motion for post-conviction relief pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 27.26. See,
e.g., Boyer v. Moss, No. 34,993 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1973); Neal v. Ruddy, No. 35,183 (Mo.
App., D. St. L. 1973); Hunt v. Circuit Court of St. Louis, No. 35,312 (Mo. App., D. St. L.
1973). The usual procedure in the St. Louis district of the court of appeals is to communicate
directly with the respondent trial judge to determine the status of the petition. Often this
generates a written explanation by the trial judge of the reason for the delay, or a promise to
proceed with the motion appears in the appellate file, dated on the same day as the denial of
the petition.
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B. Error that Invites the Writ
The second limitation on the exercise of superintending control
is the nature of error that the writ is to cure. The claim of error must
involve failure to perform a ministerial duty, want of jurisdiction,
or "excess of jurisdiction." Stated negatively, there is a class of error
that is not curable by writ, regardless of whether an appellate remedy is adequate."
None of this helps to determine the proper limits to place on
these categories. The cases and treatises explain and justify the
issuance of writs by practice in the common law courts of England
before Jamestown was settled. Ordinary error is distinguished from
"excess of jurisdiction" and "failure to perform a ministerial duty"
as if these terms were self-defined and clearly separable. The problem remains: what is there about some claims of error that makes
them proper subjects for special interlocutory review despite the
absence of appeal?
A functional distinction between legislative and judicial
(superintending) regulation of review of claims of error may be
helped by distinguishing between reasons for providing such review
and between classes of error. Where the primary concern is with the
development and administration of rules for the settlement of disputes, and with the fair and proper settlement of a specific dispute
submitted to the judicial system, it is reasonable for the legislature
to determine the degree to which appellate courts should control the
development of doctrine, as well as the number of courts a person
should have available to him for the protection of his interests.
Claims of error may, however, relate less to fairness and propriety
of decision than to the operation and organization of the judicial
system, or to the relations between the members of that system and
nonjudicial organs of government. Where this administrative concern is primary, it is reasonable to allocate control over the way
administrative authority is exercised to the superintending court.
Such a distinction relegates the requirement that there be no ade78.

In State ex ret. Howe v. Hughes, 343 Mo. 827, 123 S.W.2d 105 (En Banc 1938), a

writ was held not a proper remedy to prevent partial distribution of an estate by an unbonded
executor where the respondent judge did not require a refund bond. In State ex rel. Kansas
City v. Harris, 357 Mo. 1166, 212 S.W.2d 733 (1948), refusal to dismiss on the ground of the
plaintiff's election of remedies was held not the kind of error curable by writ. State ex rel.
Deering Milliken, Inc. v. Meyer, 449 S.W.2d 870 (St. L. Mo. App. 1970), and State ex rel.
Henry v. Cracraft, 237 Mo. App. 194, 168 S.W.2d 953 (1943), held res judicata to be a matter
of defense, and not of jurisdiction or ministerial duty. State ex rel. Schoenbacher v. Kelly,
408 S.W.2d 383 (St. L. Mo. App. 1966), held the same as to want of "equity jurisdiction."
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quate alternative remedy to a subsidiary role-that of assuring both
legislative supremacy in the regulation of appellate jurisdiction, and
economical utilization of appellate court time.
1. Ministerial Duty
Ministerial duty can be thought of as something as to which
there is neither judgment nor discretion.79 The only permissible decision is a correct one. Some duty is seen easily to be ministerial,
even though the person obliged to do it must be given some leeway
in interpreting his instructions. Once a judgment is rendered or a
writ is ordered, it must be docketed. Once an appeal is taken or
venue is changed, papers must be gathered, verified, and transferred. On the other hand, when the person obliged to perform a
specified duty is a judge, who is given judgment with respect to the
existence, proper invocation, and proper performance of that duty,
it is hard to distinguish such a failure to perform a duty from any
other legal error.
Historically, the judicial duty to proceed with a case was enforced by mandamus, or by the equitable writ, procedendo ad
judicum. 1This expands easily to justify superintending control over
any refusal to proceed even if that refusal is based on an erroneous
judgment of a kind that a trial judge is authorized to make-e.g.,
dismissal for want of personal jurisdiction. One way out may be to
argue that any legal decision with respect to the existence, invocation, or proper performance of a duty is "preliminary" to the duty
itself. Since every judicial act entails some ministerial duty to execute formal evidence of that act (such as signing a judgment or
order), this could bring almost all claims of error within the category
of "ministerial duty" and the reach of superintending control. 1 One
need not go that far to prevent unreasonable delay with respect to
motions or other claims to relief. The distinction drawn supra, be79. Moving from and to be executed by purely ministerial officers, it demands
neither that discretion or discrimination required to be exercised by a court, but
simply an intelligent compliance with the statute, such as will serve the end of its
enactment and no more.
State ex rel. Phillips v. Barton, 300 Mo. 76, 87, 254 S.W. 85, 88 (En Banc 1923).
80. See 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMENTAMES ON THE LAWS OFENGLAND 109-11 (8th ed. 1778).
81. In State ex rel. Smith v. Greene, 494 S.W.2d 55 (Mo. En Banc 1973), prohibition
issued to prevent the striking of a claim for punitive damages. The court seems to have

associated this kind of error with "abuse of discretion," because in the opinion it stated: "The
trial court has no discretion to rule contrary to the law.

"Id.

at 60. See pt. IV B § (2)(c)

of this article, infra.
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tween appellate and superintending functions, would certainly justify exercise of the latter when delay in granting relief is so unreasonable as to amount to a refusal to act at all. Not only is there no
appealable order, but the refusal to act implicates the very operation of the judicial system as a functioning agency for dispute processing. On the other hand, erroneous denial or grant of a motion
or a claim is not such a failure of function-it is just the opposite;
and superintending intervention is not justified.
An "abuse of discretion" has been held either to be a failure to
perform a ministerial duty, or an excess of jurisdiction."2 If discretion is "the power to choose between two or more courses of action,
each of which is thought permissible," 3 then abuse of discretion is
no more than error with respect to the existence of that power, or
with respect to the principles or standards that limit its exercise.
The erring judge's "abuse" in acting or refusing to act resembles
very closely any other error with respect to the grant or denial of
relief.
2.

Jurisdiction

a. Of the Subject Matter
Like "property," "jurisdiction" is a term that has been used for
many purposes and has carried many different meanings. Both
terms have been used to limit the availability of judicial remedies,
and each has become distorted and lost function and definition.84
82. If a judge refuses to exercise discretion because he believes he has no authority to
do so (no discretion), a writ may be granted because the trial judge violated a ministerial
duty-to exercise discretion. If he exercises discretion wrongly, a writ will issue because he
has "abused his discretion" and has either violated a ministerial duty or acted in excess of
jurisdiction. Compare State ex rel. Lucas v. Moss, 498 S.W.2d 289 (Mo. En Banc 1973), with
State ex reL. Mo. Pub. Serv. Co. v. Elliott, 434 S.W.2d 532 (Mo. En Banc 1968).
In State ex rel. Musser v. Dahms, 458 S.W.2d 865 (K.C. Mo. App. 1970), a probate judge
refused to approve an affidavit for appeal to the circuit court from a decision on a guardianship, because the appellant lacked standing. The court of appeals held that the submission
of the affidavit "ousted" the probate judge of jurisdiction, and that the standing issue would
be heard in the circuit court. So, why submit the affidavit to the probate judge with a motion
to allow the appeal? Why, so the judge can sign it, of course!
83.

H. HART & A. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND

162 (1958 tentative ed.).
84. For example, when injunctions were limited to the protection of rights to property,
the term expanded to include almost any claim for such relief. Compare Gee v. Pritchard, 2
Swanston 402 (1818), with Dixon v. Holden, L.R. 7 Eq. Cas. 488 (1869). When habeas corpus
was limited to testing the legality of detention, going no further than the authority of the jailer
and, later, the "jurisdiction" of the committing official, the term "jurisdiction" came to
include, at least for federal courts, almost any reversible error. See Kaufman v. United States,
APPLICATION OF LAW
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If jurisdictional error is important enough to warrant special, superintending regulation, the class of jurisdictional matters that receive
such treatment should be limited by the reason for that importance.
The significance of "jurisdiction" is partly historical, the term having been used as a weapon in interjudicial and intergovernmental
wars.8 5 But the exercise of superintending control in a centralized
judicial system can hardly rest on the history of writs in preCromwellian England. The narrowest and most easily justified use
of the term "jurisdiction" ties it to the authority of a court to deal
with a class of cases, usually defined in terms of issues, parties,
amounts in controversy, or justiciability. Another use of the term
might include the determination of persons who may be bound by
a court's judgment and geographical limitations on the area from
which cases may come to a specific court. These are dealt with in
the next subpart.
Subject matter jurisdiction is distributed and limited for many
different reasons. An agency or specialized court may be given exclusive jurisdiction over a matter in order to provide initial expert
treatment of certain kinds of disputes.8 Government convenience
and institutional harmony within government may require that certain disputes be left to a designated court, 7 or that they be excluded
from courts initially 8 or altogether.8 9 Relations within a federal sys394 U.S. 217 (1969); Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953). Missouri has gone in a similar
direction. See In re F.C., 484 S.W.2d 21 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1972); Osborn v. Owsley, 259
S.W.2d 129 (K.C. Mo. App. 1953).
85. See notes 21-28, supra.
86. For example, the reservation of exclusive authority with respect to juvenile offenders to the juvenile court, or the restriction of certain workmen's claims to a workmen's
compensation tribunal.
87. As in the designation of a specific court of claims for suits against the state, or the
imposition of a non-waivable venue limitation on suits against public officials.
88. Primary jurisdiction and a requirement of exhaustion of administrative remedies
may be jurisdictional in this sense. See State ex rel. Cirese v. Ridge, 345 Mo. 1096,138 S.W.2d
1012 (En Banc 1940).
89. A matter may be withdrawn from the courts because it is unsuited to judicial
treatment, or because judicial treatment may interfere with the authority or operation of
other agencies of government. An example of either may be the unreviewability of the exercise
of prosecutorial discretion. A matter may be partially withdrawn by restrictions on standing
or by special rules concerning proper plaintiffs, in order to reduce the occasion for judicial
lawmaking or intervention. Examples are: the restriction of plaintiffs in suits to abate public
nuisances to prosecuting attorneys or attorneys general and the requirement that quo warranto suits be brought, or at least approved, by the attorney general. It is doubtful that a
decision in violation of limitations such as these or those suggested in note 88 supra, would
be subject to collateral attack by a party. But see State ex reL. Dalton v. Mattingly, 275
S.W.2d 34 (Spr. Mo. App. 1955).
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tern may produce exclusive control over certain kinds of cases by a
specific judiciary." None of these functions, however, relates at all
to fairness to the parties, or to the wisdom, lawfulness, or justice of
the result. It is easy to argue that reasons for drawing jurisdictional
lines are often hard to find (and if found, hard to justify), but that
is of no concern here. More relevant is the question whether extraordinary, superintending protection of these lines is necessary-or
even helpful.
Jurisdictional lines already receive ample protection. A party
may raise error as to subject matter jurisdiction at any time during
the processing of the case, and even collaterally," regardless of
whether he originally invoked jurisdiction. If a party does not raise
want of subject matter jurisdiction, the judge must. These should
be sufficient deterrents to prevent a plaintiff from taking jurisdictional lines lightly or to prevent him from colluding with the defendant in choice of courts. A superintending writ does not give additional protection to jurisdiction lines; rather, it merely protects a
party from suffering totally useless litigation-regardless of whether
he prevails on the merits. If the jurisdictional defect is such as to
subject the outcome to collateral attack, the writ will be unavailable
in the very case where such attack is most likely-where neither
party nor the judge raises the issue at trial. Once the issue is raised
and decided in favor of jurisdiction, the danger of collateral attack
is gone. 3 If no writ were available, the only added burden on the
90. For example, the exclusive jurisdiction of federal courts over certain kinds of cases
raising issues under the federal copyright and patent laws, 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a), and the
supposedly "jurisdictional" prerequisite of domicile in divorce cases. As to divorce jurisdiction see Alton v. Alton, 207 F.2d 667, 684-85 (3d Cir. 1953) (Hastie, J., dissenting).
91. A convinced conceptualist might argue that, if due process requires judicial process,
it is denied if the cause is coram non judice. Note, however, that knowing submission to a
court without jurisdiction over the subject matter does not cure the defect, although it should
avoid any due process objections. Also, a court can, in effect, confer subject matter jurisdiction on itself, subject to reversal on appeal, by rendering an erroneous judgment. Such
judgments are foreclosed from collateral attack as is any other erroneous judgment. Healy v.
Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe R.R., 287 S.W.2d 813 (Mo. 1956). Missouri has not gone as far
as have the federal courts, which have foreclosed a jurisdictional issue that was not raised or
decided in a former proceeding, even to objection by persons not party to that former proceed-

ing. Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371 (1940).
92.

Collateral attack is a decreasingly important or available remedy. See Healy v.

Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe R.R., 287 S.W.2d 813 (Mo. 1956). See also Dobbs, Beyond
Bootstrap:Foreclosing the Issue of Subject Matter JurisdictionBefore Final Judgment, 51
MINN. L. REv. 491 (1967); Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371

(1940).
93. See cases cited note 92 supra.
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parties that differs from one that results from any other error is the
possibility that the victorious party will lose his victory by a late,
successful objection to jurisdiction. The plaintiff who may lose his
victory without hope for retrial is not the one who will seek the writ,
as he is the proponent of jurisdiction-unless he loses on the merits.
It may be quite reasonable to argue that the plaintiff should look
out for himself. Nonetheless, objection to jurisdiction can waste
much judicial effort, whoever wins. If the jurisdictional error is not
waivable, it may be worth the cost to provide interlocutory review
by way of superintending control in such cases.
Where the problem is one of traffic control and conflict avoidance between courts or between courts and administrative agencies,
superintending control can be justified without recourse to a "jurisdiction" label. These are always a matter of concern to a superintending court, because they relate to the operation of the judicial
system as such. Moreover, such cases can be quickly handled, and
they normally arise only once. Conflict between circuit and appellate courts usually involves post-conviction orders which are appealable. If, however, a circuit court insists on execution despite supersedeas, a writ to stop execution is easily justified and quickly issued.
If conflict is between trial courts, or between a court and an administrative agency, the writ is likely the only way to avoid confusion
and wasted effort (and an undue burden on the litigants). The writ
has issued to avoid imposition of inconsistent obligations on a party
by orders from two courts, 94 to prevent multiple litigation of the
same issues, or to force litigation of related issues in the same proceedings.95
b.

Quasijurisdiction: Service of Process, Venue, and Local Actions
In Missouri, want of jurisdiction to adjudicate as to the defendant (or, stated more concisely if less accurately, want of "personal
jurisdiction") and improper venue (other than in some local actions)
are waivable by the aggrieved party. Both are grounds for invoking
superintending control. As to venue, exercise of superintending con94. State ex rel. O'Connel v. Nangle, 365 Mo. 198, 280 S.W.2d 96 (En Banc 1955); State
ex rel. Kaiser v. Miller, 316 Mo. 372, 289 S.W. 898 (1926).
95. State ex rel. Kincannon v. Schoenlaub, 521 S.W.2d 391 (Mo. En Banc 1975), changing the rule of State ex rel. Dunphy v. Eversole, 399 S.W.2d 506 (St. L. Mo. App. 1960),
because of an amendment to the supreme court rules; State ex rel. Catholic Charities of St.
Louis v. Hoester, 494 S.W.2d 70 (Mo. En Banc 1973); State ex rel. Dzurian v. Hoester, 494
S.W.2d 67 (Mo. En Banc 1973). For a case in which the jurisdictional language may have
misled a court, see Cutten v. Latshaw, 344 S.W.2d 257 (K.C. Mo. App. 1961).
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trol may have come in part from the careless equation of "jurisdiction" with "venue" in early cases. 6 But it is easier (if still quite
difficult) to justify enforcement of venue rules by writ through the
interrelationship between venue and service of process, which was
established in Yates v. Casteel" and carried to an extreme in State
ex rel. Rhine v. Montgomery." In Yates the trial court's venue was
conceded, but it was held that the court could not obtain personal
jurisdiction by service of process in a county other than the one in
which the issuing court sat. The holding was based on a reading of
the venue statute as implying a territorial limit on the service of
process. Rhine, on the other hand, held that a defect in venue was
a defect in service. 9 As a result, improper venue, like want of personal jurisdiction, became a ground for collateral attack on default
judgments after the period of limitations had run.
Sufficiency of service is a prerequisite to assertion of personal
jurisdiction, and personal jurisdiction is jurisdiction for all purposes, including superintending control. Or so goes the reasoning.
Once, courts bound only those who submitted to their judgments,
and the efficacy of those judgments often depended upon the authority of officers of the court, or of the town or lord who held the
court, to seize the defendant or his goods.'" Such authority to seize
or arrest was conferred by a writ of summons and was territorially
limited. Hence, it made some sense to speak of the territorial limits
on a court's personal jurisdiction and of the necessity of service of
process to assert such jurisdiction. Today, the connection between
authority to bind by judgments and authority to arrest or seize is
gone, but the formality of service of process as a kind of symbolic
arrest remains, along with the concept of territorially limited personal jurisdiction. Now, however, process is served by persons who
have no authority to seize or arrest, and is authorized by state law
96. See, e.g., Lindell Real Estate Co. v. Lindell, 133 Mo. 386 (1895).
97. 329 Mo. 401, 49 S.W.2d 68 (1932).
98. 422 S.W.2d 661 (Spr. Mo. App. 1967).
99. Id.
100. The forms of writs are set out in H. STEPHEN, A TREATISE ON THE PRINCIPLES OF
PLEADING CIVIL ACTIONS § 51 (1894). A writ took one of two forms, both of which were addressed to the sheriff. The person served could be ordered to set things right (as set out in
the writ) or show cause why he would not, or he could be ordered to appear at a specified
place and time to answer the complaint set out in the writ. Where the writ was returned and
the defendant did not appear, he could be arrested by authority of the writ, capias ad
respondendum. Often the capias was the only writ issued to save time. Id. at 98.
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with respect to persons who are beyond the reach of that state's
coercive power. As between nations or parts of a federal system,
constitutions, treaties, and conventions, as well as local laws, limit
the extent to which a court will call a person to attend or suffer
judgment.10 1 Insistence on giving proper formal service jurisdictional
significance may be explained as either an anachronism, or as a
means by which certainty is assured with respect to giving notice.
It is likely a little of both.
If personal jurisdiction may be conferred by consent, it begins
to look more like privilege against judgment that arises from the
defendant's relationship to the forum, rather than the regulation of
intercourt or intergovernmental relationships. No greater international or interstate issue is raised by personal jurisdiction than by
interstate or international taxation or by choice-of-law. Clearly,
however, these are not matters of jurisdiction, even though, like
notice, they may affect enforcement of a judgment. Within a state,
the connection between service of process and a court's personal
jurisdiction serves only a notice assurance function; it makes little
sense to tie service to enforcement of venue restrictions, and thus
to treat counties or circuits like sovereign states. In any case, defects
in service and want of personal jurisdiction are hard to distinguish
from other waivable defenses in terms of justifying the exercise of
superintending authority. There is no special need for superintending control over these errors.
If venue is not jurisdictional, it is even less attractive as a
subject for protection by writ. Venue does generally assure that the
forum will not be inconvenient to the defendant." 2 Where a forum
with proper venue is inconvenient, the defendant may seek
another-e.g., by a motion to dismiss, grounded on forum non
conveniens. In both cases of inconvenience, the defendant must look
101. The effect of a court's acts is limited by locally effective rules of law which limit a
court's assertion of authority, including accepted international and interstate custom, and
by the practices of courts in other states or countries respecting recognition and enforcement
of judgments. Normally, in the United States, local validity and compulsory recognition of
judgments ("full faith and credit") are usually co-extensive, but there are areas-e.g., injunctions, where a judgment or decree is valid in the rendering state but is not entitled to full
compulsory recognition.
102. Jurisdiction to adjudicate with respect to a given defendant is far less concerned
with the assurance of a convenient forum to the defendant. The balance in determining
whether there is such jurisdiction is between the plaintiff's convenience and the unreasonableness of a state's serving that convenience. See International Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S.
310 (1945); Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 fll.2d 432, 176 N.E.2d
761 (1961).
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out for himself or lose his objection. Again, it is hard to see why such
protection, which does not affect the operation of the judicial system
or state government, should be a matter of special, superintending.
concern. But some venue is a bit more serious than other venue in
Missouri. In some local actions, venue is not waivable, even though
it is also not a matter of jurisdiction. This legal solecism is the
product of the decision in Howell v. Reynolds."°3
In the earliest days of jury trials all suits were "local," because
jurors, who were also witnesses, were drawn from the place where
the cause of action "arose." Once selected, the jury could be taken
elsewhere for trial."° ' A result of this practice is the so-called "local
action rule," which limited suits concerning title to or possession of
realty to the state or county where the land lies." 5 In 1909, this rule
produced an exception to the requirement of full faith and credit to
judgments, when the Supreme Court held in Fall v. Eastin"' that a
state court had no "jurisdiction" to render a decree with respect to
title to land in another state. Despite the jurisdictional language in
that case, state courts have rendered and enforced decrees with
respect to land in other states. 107
Missouri's present special venue statute for local suits provides:
Suits for the possession of real estate, or whereby the title
thereto may be affected, or for the enforcement of the lien of any
special tax bill thereon, shall be brought in the county where such
real estate, or some part thereof, is situated."'1
This statute had its origin in a statute that related only to suits in
equity. 01 The first portion of the present statute appeared in the
1866 Revised Statutes and was a minor revision of the 1856 version
which spoke of suits "concerning real estate.""10 The second portion
103.

249 S.W.2d 381 (Mo. 1952).

104. See A.T. VONMEHRIEN, THE LAW OF MULTnSTATE PROBLEMs, 779-80 (1965).
105. Livingston v. Jefferson, 15 F. Cas. 660 (No. 8411) (C.C. Va. 1811).
106. 215 U.S. 1 (1909). For a discussion of this case, see B. Currie, FullFaithand Credit
to ForeignLand Decrees, 21 U. Cm. L. REV. 620 (1954).
107. See, e.g., Rozan v. Rozan, 49 Cal.2d 322, 317 P.2d 11 (1957); McElreath v. McElreath, 162 Tex. 190, 345 S.W.2d 722 (1961).
108. § 508.030, RSMo 1969.
109. Suits in equity concerning real estate or whereby the same may be affected, shall be brought in the county within which the defendants or a majority of
them, if inhabitants of the state, reside; or if all the defendants are not residents,
then in any county.
Ch. 128 § 2, RSMo 1835.
110. Ch, 128, RSMo 1856; Ch. 163, § 4 G.S. 1866.
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of the present statute was added in 1909.111 Coleman v. Lucksinger 2
held that this venue provision was a modification of the old "local
action rule," and that suits which affect title "indirectly" are excluded from that local venue requirement. But cases before and
after Coleman interpreted the statute in a way which made local
venue as waivable as any other venue.113 In Rice v. Griffith"4 damages were sought in a suit in Jackson County for breach of a contract
for the sale of land in Clay County-not a local action."' The
defendant-buyer counterclaimed for specific performance, clearly
within the special venue statute, but no objection to the venue was
made until after the plaintiff appealed the defendant's victory on
the counterclaim. The supreme court held that because "circuit
courts are courts of general . . . jurisdiction . . . the plaintiff first
presenting this point in her motion for rehearing in the Kansas City
Court of Appeals, waived any issue with respect to venue."' 16 That
should have settled matters, but it did not. In Howell v. Reynolds " '
suit was brought in the City of St. Louis for damages for fraud in
the procurement of a note and deed of trust on land in St. Louis
County and for a decree to cancel the deed of trust. Venue would
have been proper were the action not local-and it once was not."'
The venue issue was not raised until appeal, which should have
foreclosed it, after Rice. But Rice was "distinguished" and limited
to counterclaims. Venue under section 508.030 was held not waivable."9 After carelessly saying that "the trial court was without jurisdiction to decree cancellation of the deed of trust," this couit conceded that no venue, not even local venue, was jurisdictional. 2 '
Otherwise local counterclaims would be included in the statute, and
Howell stated that they were not. 2' This was not a case where
111. § 1753, RSMo 1909.
112. 224 Mo. 1, 123 S.W. 441 (En Banc 1909).
113. See Ulrici v. Papin, 11 Mo. 43 (1847); Lindell Real Estate Co. v. Lindell, 133 Mo.
386, 33 S.W. 466 (1895); Rice v. Griffith, 349 Mo. 373, 161 S.W.2d 220 (1942).
114. 349 Mo. 373, 161 S.W.2d 220 (1942).
115. Were the seller seeking specific performance or damages equal to the price, however, it would be local. Sisk v. Molinaro, 376 S.W.2d 175 (Mo. 1964). But see Bladdick v.
Ozark Ore Co., 381 S.W.2d 760 (Mo. 1964).
116. 349 Mo. at 380, 161 S.W.2d at 223.
117. 249 S.W.2d 381 (Mo. 1952).
118. Briscoe v. Longmire, 148 Mo. App. 594, 128 S.W. 521 (St. L. Ct. App. 1910),
overruled sub silentio, Marston v. Catterlin, 290 Mo. 185, 234 S.W. 816 (1921).
119. 249 S.W.2d 381, 383-84 (Mo. 1952).
120. Id.
121. Id.
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achieving a desired result required making bad law. The appellees
received what they wanted despite the court's venue decision. The
supreme court ordered the trial court to amend its judgment to
include an injunction against enforcement of the note, which rendered the deed of trust worthless. Nor was this decision required in
order to further a policy of keeping actions at home; no such policy
seems to exist, given the statement in Howell about counterclaims,
and the statutory provisions for transfer of cases after they are
filed.' 2 Neither the cases cited by the court in Howell'23 nor the
language or history of the venue statutes' 24 support the nonjurisdictional nonwaivable venue decision. Howell accomplished only two
things: it makes difficult agreement by the parties to a local lawsuit
to try the suit in the most convenient forum, and it threatens the
25
stability of judgments, unless it is limited to late, direct attack.'
All this might not be so serious were it fairly easy to determine what
2
is and what is not within the reach of section 503.080. But it is not.
122. §§ 508.080, .090, RSMo 1969.
123. The court said that "the statute is mandatory as to venue. . . and this court has
consistently held it to be; and its provisions cannot be waived." 249 S.W.2d at 383. The
following cases were cited: Castleman v. Castleman, 184 Mo. 432, 83 S.W. 757 (1904); State
ex rel. Gavin v. Muench, 325 Mo. 210, 124 S.W. 1124 (En Banc 1910); Alluvial Realty Co. v.
Himmelberger-Harrison Lumber Co., 287 Mo. 299, 229 S.W. 757 (1921); Marston v. Catterlin,
290 Mo. 185, 234 S.W. 816 (1921); State ex rel. Minihan v. tAronson, 350 Mo. 309, 165 S.W.2d
404 (1942). In Castleman, venue was held proper; in Gavin want of proper venue was raised
both at trial and in a petition for a writ of prohibition; in Alluvial Realty, it was held that a
plea in abatement as to venue was properly made. In none of these cases could the issue of
waiver, much less waivability, have come up. Marston held that the trial court improperly
refused to hear an action for accounting with respect to land in another county. As the
objection was made, waivability was irrelevant. The strongest and most direct support for
Howell is Minihan, which had nothing whathever to do with venue under section 508.030. But
Minihan did contain random dicta at the end of the opinion which suggested the rule in
Howell.
124. The venue statutes all provide that the action "shall be brought" where the statute
indicates it should. The language of section 508.030, RSMo 1969, is no more mandatory than
is that in section 508.010 or section 508.020, relating to suits commenced by summons or by
attachment.
125. Unwaivable, nonjurisdictional venue in Howell may be so unwaivable as to allow
objection to venue to survive the lawsuit and be raised by the losing defendant by way of
collateral attack.
126. Unless the effect of a judgment on the right to possession or the title is "direct"-e.g., by ordering conveyance or removing a cloud from title, it should not be within
the local venue statute. See State ex rel. South Missouri Lumber Co. v. Deary, 180 Mo. 53,
79 S.W. 454 (En Banc 1903); Bladdick v. Ozark Ore Co., 381 S.W.2d 760 (Mo. 1964). But see
State ex rel. City of Kirkwood v. Reynolds, 265 Mo. 88, 175 S.W. 575 (En Banc 1915).
Compare the statement in Howell that a counterclaim will not affect venue, 249 S.W.2d at
383-84, with State ex rel. Gavin v. Muench, 225 Mo. 210, 124 S.W. 1124 (En Banc 1910),
which held that an affirmative defense made that suit local.
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The Howell supervenue may at first appear to be an attractive
ground for superintending control, but it is not. The consequences
of erroneous venue are only more extreme than other reversible error
when objection is not made before appeal. Once made, the ruling is
res judicata, unless reversed on appeal. The issue remains a source
of reversal and retrial only if the person aggrieved by that error loses
at trial, or if the person aggrieved wins at trial but must counter a
successful appeal by the plaintiff. Because Howell stated that local
venue has nothing to do with jurisdiction, even the most formalistic
approach to the issuance of writs should exclude such venue as a
ground for superintending control. Moreover, there is no greater
reason for special intervention to cure error with respect to venue
or local venue than with respect to any other potential ground for
reversal that might be raised by a defendant.
c.

Jurisdiction to Render the Particular Judgment

A superintending writ will issue to cure erroneous refusal to
dismiss for failure to state a cause of action. This writ will issue only
if the petition cannot be amended to state a claim to relief, 27 but
that is no limitation on review. If a written opinion accompanies
denial of a writ, the exercise of superintending authority is no different from any other appeal. Use of the writ is justified by saying that
erroneous refusal to dismiss is "in excess of" jurisdiction or "with-

out" jurisdiction. The latter characterization implies that a trial
127. An attempted rationale was set out in State ex rel. City of Mansfield v. Crain, 301
S.W.2d 415 (Spr. Mo. App. 1957):
A greater difficulty is in locating and defining the line of demarcation between those
cases where the court has jurisdiction of the subject matter, yet undertakes by some
act to exceed such jurisdiction so obtained and is therefore subject to prohibition,
and those where the court has jurisdiction and is simply acting erroneously within
such jurisdiction.
Many cases give as the reasons for issuance of the writ that the plaintiff has
not stated and his petition cannot be amended to state a cause of action ...
Although a rule welded from such statements may not follow strict theory, in that
it makes the inability to act without error synonymous with lack of jurisdiction to
commit the error, it does furnish a practical guide to distinguish between error
within jurisdiction and excess of jurisdiction.
Id. at 420-21. Notice that if there is no demurrer, the court may well grant relief where no
cause of action "exists," regardless of whether the petition is amendable to state a cause of
action. Moreover, if a superintending court will not hear and decide a petition where it finds
that a cause of action may be stated by amendment, the trial will proceed on the unamended
petition. If it does hear and decide such a petition, the distinction drawn here serves no
function.
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court has no jurisdiction not to be correct, but that position was
rejected by the supreme court long ago. In State ex rel. Union Depot
Railroad Co. v. Valliant' a writ of prohibition was denied because
failure to state a cause of action does not raise a jurisdictional issue.
The strongest Missouri authority for the "jurisdictional" nature
of the claim to relief is in two supreme court cases, Charles v.
White' and American Constitution Fire Assurance Co. v.
O'Malley.'3 ° In Charles the supreme court held that a judgment
could not have preclusive effect with respect to issues not raised by
the lawsuit. The court stated that there was no "jurisdiction" to
" ' Sole authority for this
decide issues not properly before the court.13
jurisdictional language was a New Jersey case'32 in which "jurisdiction" in this context was explained in terms of notice and opportunity to defend, and not of the authority of a court to render judg"' Charles was followed in State ex rel. Eichorn v. Luten.3 4 In
ment. 33
that case a trustee had informed the remaindermen of a trust that
he intended to terminate the trust in favor of the life beneficiary,
claiming authority to do this under a specific provision in the trust
instrument. One of the remaindermen brought suit to prevent distribution. The other remaindermen were joined as defendants, and,
because they agreed with the plaintiff's action, defaulted. After
judgment was entered on the default, the remainderman-plaintiff
and the trustee entered into a settlement whereby most of the trust
assets would be distributed to the life beneficiary, and the rest
would go to the plaintiff. The defendant remaindermen's motion to
set aside their default was denied. Instead, the court ordered specific performance of the settlement. The remaindermen petitioned
the court of appeals for a writ of prohibition and won. As this was a
writ case rather than an appeal, the appellate court couched the
grant of the writ in jurisdictional terms:
In order that a court have jurisdiction to adjudicate, there must
be jurisdiction of the person and of the subject matter, and in
addition the court must have jurisdiction to render the particular
judgment in the particular case before it. Chuning v. Calvert, 452
128.

100 Mo. 59, 13 S.W. 398 (1890).

129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

214 Mo. 187, 112 S.W. 545 (1908).
113 S.W.2d 795 (Mo. 1937).
214 Mo. 187, 211, 112 S.W. 545, 548 (1908).
Munday v. Vail, 34 N.J.L. 418 (1871).
Id. at 423.
515 S.W.2d 857 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1974).
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S.W.2d 580 (Mo. App. 1970); State ex rel. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Weinstein, 379 S.W.2d 172 (Mo. App. 1964). Furthermore, the jurisdiction to decide particular issues in a particular case is limited to
those issues raised by the pleadings. State ex rel. Houser v. Goodman, 406 S.W.2d 121 (Mo. App. 1966).11
The last sentence, which finds no support in the cited case, is clearly
wrong if it means that a court may not decide or foreclose by decision an issue not raised in the pleadings."' In any case, both Eichorn
and Charles, especially when read in light of Union Depot Railroad
Co., are more easily understood as standing for the well-known constitutional principle that no person may be bound by a judgment
as to which he had no adequate notice or opportunity to defend.
Inadequate notice and opportunity to defend are grounds for avoidance of a judgment, but they have nothing whatever to do with
jurisdiction. 37 Moreover, in Eichorn there was no special need for
superintending relief-even from the point of view of the remaindermen. It is doubtful that the trustee would have distributed any
assets before it was clear that the remaindermen had no way to
attack the distribution. Had the remaindermen appealed the denial
of their motion to set aside their defaults, had they sued for an
injunction to prevent distribution, or had they waited and then sued
to charge the trustee for improper distribution of the assets, the
trustee's authority to distribute would have been an issue. 38 Since
the remaindermen were neither parties to nor represented in any
sense by parties to the settlement, they could not be bound by it,
so any distribution to the plaintiff-remainderman could subject the
trustee to surcharge. Prohibition was, however, probably the quickest way to determine the issues and to save the trustee a great deal
of trouble.
"' repreAmerican ConstitutionFireAssurance Co. v. O'Malley39
135. Id. at 859.
136. For example, merger and bar will preclude parties on matters not raised by them
if they should have been raised in that proceeding. Also, a plaintiff is not bound by his ad
damnun from receiving a higher damage award in a contested case.
137. See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
138. Had the appeal from the order refusing to set aside the defaults been refused or
lost, it would have been because the remaindermen defendants were not aggrieved by the
settlement and order-they were not bound by it. Had the appeal been successful, of course,
they would have amended their pleadings and attacked the settlement in the trial court and
on appeal. Appeal was probably not necessary anyway, since the remaindermen were not
bound, and the trouble they could have caused the trustee may have led to a more generally
acceptable settlement with respect to distribution of assets.
139. 113 S.W.2d 795 (Mo. 1937).
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sents another use of "jurisdiction to render the particular judgment." Suit was brought to reverse the refusal of the Superintendent of the Department of Insurance to allow a rate increase under a
statute whereby such decisions were reviewable de novo in circuit
court. The Superintendent based his decision on individual experience data, but the insurers, joined as plaintiffs in the suit to reverse
that decision, insisted on basing their claim on aggregate data. The
circuit court dismissed and the supreme court affirmed, apparently
on the ground that the circuit court did not have jurisdiction to hear
a claim based on aggregate data. The supreme court also said, however, that jurisdiction of a circuit court dos not depend on the
statement of a cause of action. 4 At most, this rather opaque decision can be interpreted as support for the proposition that jurisdiction to review an administrative decision, when based on statute, is
limited to the scope allowed by statute. The decision has nothing
to do with claims to relief, whether common law or statutory, out141
side the area of administrative law.
All the loose talk about jurisdiction and undiscriminating use
14
of case authority in the writ cases resulted in Chuning v. Calvert. 1
In this case, the supreme court's holding in Union Depot Railroad
Co. was neither cited nor followed, and the court of appeals presented the first square holding that a court has no jurisdiction if the
plaintiff does not state a claim on which relief may be granted.
Kansas City had been allowed to intervene in a suit by a Kansas
City fireman for personal injuries. Kansas City had paid the fireman
for his injuries and sought to recover this amount from the defendant. Missouri prohibits assignment of, or subrogation to, personal
injury claims, so the intervenor could not have stated a cause of
action on which relief could be granted. But no one objected until
after the jury returned with a verdict for Kansas City and none for
the fireman. The fireman appealed, arguing that Kansas City stated
140. Id. at 802.
141. See State ex rel. State Highway Comm'n v. Elliot, 326 S.W.2d 745 (Mo. En Banc
1959), as to the scope of review in condemnation cases. Appeal was fully adequate, but the
jurisdiction point was not completely without merit. See also State ex reL. Tucker v. Mattingly, 275 S.W.2d 34 (Spr. Mo. App. 1955), which held that a quo warranto proceeding was
not barred by a dismissal on the merits of a similar suit by private citizens. As the attorney
general is a real party in the quo warranto proceeding, there was no problem in holding that
he was not bound by the dismissal in the first suit-and that is what the court held. Alternatively, the court held that the circuit court had no jurisdiction in the first suit on issues that
may only be raised by quo warranto. See notes 88 and 89, supra.
142. 452 S.W.2d 580 (K.C. Mo. App. 1970).
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no cause of action, and hence should not have been allowed to
intervene. In Missouri, failure to state a cause of action may be
raised for the first time on appeal.' Moreover, error relating to the
allowance of subrogation to personal injury claims is probably plain
error.' But for some unfathomable reason, the court of appeals
ignored these open doors, and held that the intervenor's failure to
state a claim deprived the circuit court of jurisdiction to render
judgment. The court cited no case that gave substantial support for
its analysis.
If Chuning were the law, the implications for review by writ
would be great, but no greater than its implications for the stability
of judgments. Consider the position of a wife who sued for loss of
her husband's consortium and won before the supreme court decided, in another case, that such a cause of action exists. Is her
judgment subject to collateral attack? Chuning might also be authority for holding that a third party complaint may not be brought
because it could not be filed as a plaintiff's claim. After all, the
Missouri Rules do not affect jurisdiction,'4 and a suit for damages
states no cause of action unless actual loss is alleged. Other equally
silly speculation might be appropriate if Chuning were good law in
Missouri.
Where the cause of action is statutory, the problem is the same.
The association between statutory remedies and jurisdiction first
arose in divorce cases, but the decisions in which the issue is discussed were all on direct appeal. Other authority for the jurisdictional nature of a claim under a statutory right to relief comes from
election cases. In State ex rel. Bonzan v. Weinstein'46 prohibition
was sought to prevent the entry of an injunction ordering a new
primary election. Had the parties waited a day, appeal would have
been available, and it could have been given expeditious treatment
by the court of appeals. The election law required that there be a
recount before any other remedy was sought, but a recount here
would have been futile because the election was by voting machine,
and no one was contesting the actual count. On the other hand, a
new primary election for only one party could have produced serious
problems. Prohibition was granted, and the court of appeals justified it by talking about jurisdiction:
143.
144.
145.
146.

Mo. Sup. CT. R. 55.27.
See Mo. Sup. CT. R. 79.04.
Mo. Sup. CT. R. 51.01.
514 S.W.2d 357 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1974).
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Since election contests are statutory actions ... the jurisdiction of the circuit court is defined by the election statutes and "the
letter of the law is the limit of its power."' 47
To support this proposition, the court cited State ex ret. Phillips v.
Barton.'48 A close reading of Phillips, however, suggests that the
"limit of its power" language has little relevance to jurisdiction. The
court in Phillips was more concerned with the correctness of decision. If Bonzan is taken seriously, then futility is no longer an exception to the requirement that administrative remedies be exhausted,
if those remedies are set forth in a statute. More than that, Bonzan
suggests that any error in the application of a statutory remedy not
merely declaratory of common law-e.g., damages provisions of the
Uniform Commercial Code, is open to attack as void for want of
jurisdiction. But Bonzan may be merely another example of the
forced use of "jurisdiction" to justify the issuance of a writ.
Interlocutory review of claims of error in these cases is justifiable only if it will save judicial time or avoid injustice. The only way
in which review of refusals to dismiss or to strike will save total
judicial time by shortcircuiting bad claims is if it is more likely than
not that such refusals are erroneous. And even if they were more
often than not erroneous, the possibility of the plaintiff nevertheless
losing on the merits should serve to limit the value of such shortcircuiting. Refusal of interlocutory review not only saves appellate
court time, but also avoids premature lawmaking with respect to
what remedies the law will allow. The argument that suffering trial
and judgment on a bad claim is reason to grant a writ is not only
probably wrong, but also irrelevant, especially if an interlocutory
order of a court is unreviewable because it takes irreversible effect
before final judgment.' The argument for interlocutory review then
becomes identical to an argument for review of final judgments on
147. Id. at 362. The court could have justified the issuance of a writ by the need for
expedition on a matter of public importance. See note 71 supra; State ex rel. McGaughey v.
Grayston, 349 Mo. 700, 163 S.W.2d 335 (En Banc 1942). See also State ex rel. McClellan v.
Godfrey, 519 S.W.2d 4 (Mo. En Banc 1975), in which the public importance of the issue
overcame all the possible objections to the issuance of a writ, including the requirement under

Supreme Court Rule 84.22 that the case first go to the court of appeals. A quick look at the
cases indicates that appeal was. more than adequate in this case to get the issues directly to

the supreme court. See In re M.K.R., 515 S.W.2d 467 (Mo. En Banc 1975).
148. 300 Mo. 76, 254 S.W.2d 85 (En Banc 1923).
149.

See, e.g., State ex reL Missouri State High School Activities Ass'n v. Schoenlaub,

507 S.W.2d 354 (Mo. En Banc 1974). The court spoke in jurisdictional terms but a quick
translation shows the problem to be failure to state a ground for judicial relief.
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appeal. If superintending control is exercisable to prevent error in
such a case, then inadequacy of appeal would be enough in itself to
trigger superintending authority. This is at least theoretically incorrect and is flatly inconsistent with legislative control of access to
appellate review.
3.
(1).

Excess of Jurisdiction
a. Generally
Necessity of the Category

If superintending control is confined to the administration of
the judicial system, it must include concern for what are not strictly
matters of ministerial duty or of jurisdiction. But to call error of that
sort "excess of jurisdiction" is a bit dramatic. Two kinds of claims
of error that do not relate to jurisdiction or ministerial duty have
already been suggested as properly reviewable by the exercise of
superintending control: where the matter arises because of conflict
between courts in the exercise of authority or because of threatened
duplication of judicial effort, 5 ' and where the matter arises because
of a judge's failure to act at all within a reasonable time as to a
matter properly before him. 5 ' In the latter case, the concern is with
the functioning of the system at all, rather than with the maintenance of jurisdictional lines, the performance of duty as a ministerial officer of the system, or fairness to the parties. If a judge is
obligated to act in a fair, rational, and informed way in the performance of his duties, failure so to act may be seen as the equivalent of
a refusal to act at all, since that also goes to the failure of the system
to function at all, rather than merely to misfunction. If a writ is a
proper method to compel decision, it may also be a proper method
to prevent error which is so clearly and obviously unlawful that it
cannot be justified as the product of rational, informed, fairly exercised judgment. Fortunately, system failure of either kind is rare
and can be dealt with easily. The major problem in such a case is
whether the judge actually did what he is accused of doing in the
petition for a writ.
As a category of claims of error that invite superintending intervention, "excess of jurisdiction" has come to include much more
than matters that implicate the proper operation of the judicial
system.' 52 The pressure to do justice, to correct error, to prevent
150.
151.
152.

See notes 94, 95 supra.
See text after note 81 supra.
See, e.g., note 47 supra.
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apparently improper imposition upon parties, and perhaps to settle
legal questions-to make law-now, have given this category the
quality of a rubber sack into which is tossed nearly every kind of
error that the imagination of counsel or court cannot force into any
other ground for a writ.
(2). Enforcement of the Mandate of an Appellate Court
When a case is remanded by an appellate court for further
proceedings or the entry of an order, it is accompanied by the appellate court's mandate. If that mandate is not followed, the appellate
court will enforce it by writ." 3 It is not difficult to justify a writ in
such cases, because failure to obey the direct order of a superior
tribunal, framed for the specific case, jeopardizes the maintenance
of authority relationships within the system. This is significantly
different from the erroneous application of controlling authority.
The problem is that, from the standpoint of efficient judicial operation, the difference is really not all that clear. A mandate may be
unclear in its requirements. This may be because the appellate
court gave insufficient guidance in its opinion, or because it purported to deal with more than was presented to it or was necessary
to disposition. The appellate court may also have left unclear or
untreated the appropriate response by the trial judge to matters
which may arise after remand, and with which that judge must deal.
Whether disobedience of the mandate comes from excusable
mistake or from defiant refusal to obey, a writ may be inappropriate
in terms of judicial economy. The mandate may issue because of
reversal of an order dismissing a petition or granting summary judgment, or it may require a new trial. In such cases, the person aggrieved by the trial court's disobedience may either win his case or
have other grounds for reversal as well. In Wells v. Henry W. Kuhs
Realty Co. "I a plaintiff's child was injured on defendant's junk pile
and later died of those injuries. Suit for wrongful death was brought
on two theories: negligence per se, because the junk pile was in
violation of city ordinances, and maintaining an attractive nuisance. The trial court dismissed the case, but the supreme court
reversed, saying that either ground for recovery stated a proper
153. If the issuing court is the supreme court, then that court will also enforce its
mandate. The petitioner for the writ need not comply with the requirements of Supreme
Court Rule 84.22, which makes good sense if the mandate needs clarification in order to be
enforced.
154. 269 S.W.2d 761 (Mo. 1954).
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cause of action. Nevertheless, after remand, the trial court struck
the negligence per se claim. The plaintiff sought a writ, and the
supreme court ordered the claim reinstated.155 Had the plaintiff
gone to trial he might have won on the attractive nuisance claim,
obviating any need to enforce the mandate in that case. On the
other hand, there was so little justification for the trial court's action
that the issuance of the writ required relatively little effort on the
part of the supreme court.
If the failure to obey the mandate effectively deprives a party
of its benefit, a writ may be more justified, as it was in State ex rel.
' A school district had sued for possession of a
Stites v. Goodman.56
nearly completed building and demanded damages from the contractor for nonperformance. The contractor counterclaimed for 90
percent of the contract price for substantial completion and for
damages arising from delays for which the plaintiff was allegedly
responsible. The school district was put into possession of the building, and later damages were awarded to both sides. The supreme
court reversed 57' in order to allow the trial judge to use more accurate figures. The supreme court stated that the school district was
entitled to a completed building, and its mandate ordered the trial
court to set off against the contractor's claim any money that "has
in fact been expended to finally complete the building." ' The trial
court read the opinion as allowing the school board to set off expenditures made in fact, and not merely owed or estimated, in the actual
completion of the building. But the school district, in possession
since early in the litigation, had no plans for completing the building. Nonetheless, the trial judge ordered that the entry of judgment
for the contractor be stayed until such plans were made and money
was expended. Mandamus was sought to order entry of judgment
and thereby to limit the amount that the school district could set
off against the contractor's claim. The supreme court, which seemed
unjustifiably exasperated with the trial judge's misreading of its
mandate, granted the writ. 59'
b. Discovery
Missouri's rules of civil procedure governing discovery"'0 rely
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

State ex rel. Wells v. Mayfield, 281 S.W.2d 9 (Mo. En Banc 1955).
351 S.W.2d 763 (Mo. En Banc 1961).
Bloomfield Reorganized School Dist. No. R-14 v. Stites, 336 S.W.2d 95 (Mo. 1960).
Id. at 102.
351 S.W.2d 763, 767 (Mo. En Banc 1961).
Mo. Sup. CT. R. 56-62. These rules were amended effective January 1, 1975. The
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heavily on trial court discretion for their application. As a result,
lawmaking in this area is shifted generally to the trial court level,
and a greater than normal variation in interpretation and application must be tolerated. The appellate court's role in this area is
diminished because appellate review of error in the administration
of discovery, if it comes at all, should come after final judgment, and
should be limited to error that is not "harmless."16 ' Therefore, it
should be surprising that Missouri's appellate courts have insinuated themselves in the administration and interpretation of discovery rules to the extent that they have. No matter what the discovery error, appellate intervention by writ is possible. If a court
abuses its discretion, it acts "in excess of," or, despite the language
of Rule 51.01,12 "without" jurisdiction. If the judge refuses to grant
a motion to compel or deny discovery, or to issue a protective order
because he believed he had no authority to do so, he is charged with
refusal to perform a ministerial duty.163
Consequences of erroneous discovery decisions may be serious
and may deserve interlocutory relief. However, it does not follow
that the decision to grant such relief is a matter for superintending
control. If the proponent of discovery is denied access to information, and he has no other way of skinning his discovery cat, his cause
may be so burdened as to be lost at trial. The best he could hope
for is reversal and retrial. The opponent of discovery is in both a
more difficult and a less difficult position with respect to an
erroneous request or order for discovery. To be sure, an arguably
correct discovery order may compel a party to divulge possibly privileged, often damaging, information because disobedience may result in serious sanctions,6 4 which could cause him to lose his case.
cases in this part deal with the rules before amendment.
161. Improper denial of discovery has been held reversible error. Norkunas v. Norkunas,
480 S.W.2d 92 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1972).
162. Rule 51.01 states:
These Rules shall not be construed to extend or limit the jurisdiction of the courts
of Missouri, or the venue of civil actions therein.
163. State ex rel. Williams v. Buzard, 354 Mo. 719, 190 S.W.2d 907 (En Banc 1945);
State ex rel. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co. v. McMullan, 297 S.W.2d 431 (Mo. En Banc 1957).
Federal practice is precisely the opposite. See 4 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRAcrICE 26.83 [9.-3]
(2d ed. 1975). Nonetheless, a writ was issued to protect privileged information in Pfizer, Inc.
v. Lord, 456 F.2d 545 (8th Cir. 1972). In addition, the Supreme Court of the United States
reviewed the application of FED. R. Civ. P. 35 by way of an extraordinary writ in Schlagenhauf
v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104 (1964). Discovery orders may also be appealable under 28 U.S.C. §
1292(b). See text accompanying note 13 supra. Of course, federal trial decisions are reported
in Federal Rules Decisions and the FederalSupplement, and federal trial judges have occasion to exchange ideas and to participate significantly in rulemaking and rule revision.
164. See Mo. Sup. CT. R. 61.01 before and after amendment.
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Even if discovery orders are more clearly wrong, noncompliance
may result in injury which is irremediable, either because any remedy is too late, or because the error was "harmless." On the other
hand, the opponent may seek protective orders'65 which may limit
the use of discovered material, and at the same time not deprive
him of his objection to the discovery order or request.
The availability of interlocutory relief will help the opponent of
a discovery request out of his dilemma by settling the correctness
of the order. But it will also encourage opposition to discovery requests as a trial tactic. The trial judge may be discouraged from
attempting to settle disputes with respect to requests for information, and the parties may be made more than normally unwilling
to compromise or to seek clarification or compromise of demands for
discovery, if the possibility of delay, and perhaps even an interlocutory decision holding the demand or order invalid, is possible. The
availability of a writ in this area has also tended to bring appellate
courts down on the side of limited discovery, and has increased the
likelihood that trial judges will deny enforcement to debatable discovery requests.
The least attractive, but not the least used, ground for interlocutory review and relief in this area is the claim that interrogatories
or requests for admission are vague, ambiguous, irrelevant, or burdensome in number. It is not hard to suspect that often such objections are made for delay and to avoid legitimate discovery. The
English language is not a precision tool, and vagueness and ambiguity can be cleared up by counsel through informal contacts. Refusal
of aid by interrogating or requesting counsel is certainly a ground
for resisting objections to good faith efforts at compliance with the
discovery request. Similarly, burdensomeness, whether in requests
for information or inspection of documents or evidence, or in the
number of interrogatories or requests for admissions, is properly a
matter of negotiation between counsel, rather than a ground for
resisting discovery. But the availability of interlocutory review does
not encourage such communication between counsel, especially
when the appellate courts readily find sufficient "uncertainty" or
"vagueness" to protect the opponent of discovery. In State ex rel.
Gamble Const. Co. v. Carroll6 ' the supreme court prohibited a trial
judge from requiring information concerning materials and labor on
165.
166.

See Mo. SuP. CT. R. 56.01(c).
408 S.W.2d 34 (Mo. En Banc 1966).
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a specific job. One of the interrogatories was vague and uncertain
because it sought "itemization" and "analysis." 1"7 If objecting counsel were really puzzled, a telephone call may have helped; but he
has no incentive to aid the discovery process when he can delay it
and possibly even avoid it by writ.
The divisions of the court of appeals have been enthusiastic in
their protection of parties against interrogatories. In Springfield,
answers may not be sought if they would not tend to prove anything
and if they may call for inadmissible statements."' In St. Louis,
interrogatories were prohibited because they were "obscure" and
"unclear" and really did not help the interrogator.'69 In Kansas City,
it was held that interrogatories could not be required if they "could
conceivably constitute an unwarranted invasion of.

.

. privacy."' 7 0

No issue of privilege was raised in that case.
A halfhearted and later ignored attempt to limit the use of the
writ to control discovery practice is the decision of the supreme
court in State ex rel. Norfolk and Western Ry. Co. v. Dowd. 7 ' The
plaintiff sued the relator, a railroad, for wrongful death arising from
a collision between a railroad train and an automobile. The relator
was given a list of 105 interrogatories which required 227 answers,
some of them duplicative. The relator objected that the list was
burdensome, and made specific objections to individual interrogatories. The court had two choices. It could have held that the writ was
no longer available to cure discovery error, either from the supreme
court or the court of appeals. The second choice was to decide the
case on the merits, and either issue the writ because the interrogatories were bad, or deny it because the order was proper. The court
tried to do both. It held the interrogatories proper and then stated:
Parties also should realize the fact that a writ is denied does not
mean that the trial court is error-free. It means only that the trial
court has not exceeded its jurisdiction to the point where the writ
will lie. The alleged erroneous action of the court can still be preserved and presented on appeal from final judgment in the regular
course of the litigation ... .
167. Id. at 37.
168. State ex rel. Kroger v. Craig, 329 S.W.2d 804 (Spr. Mo. App. 1959). The proponent
of discovery was seeking information from employees of the defendant, so the case is not
completely on all fours with the discussion of interrogatories. The chief value of the decision
in this case is its praise of dogs. Id. at 808-09.
169. State ex reL. Premier Panels, Inc. v. Swink, 400 S.W.2d 639 (St. L. Mo. App. 1966).
170. State ex rel. Williams v. Vardeman, 422 S.W.2d 400, 409 (K.C. Mo. App. 1967).
171. 448 S.W.2d 1 (Mo. En Banc 1969).
172. Id. at 4-5.
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Most generously, this can be read to mean that there are grounds
for reversal that are not reviewable by way of superintending control. But the line may be the same as that already drawn ad hoc
between petitions that do, and those that do not receive summary
treatment.
Dowd has been ignored as a ground for denying a writ. It has
been cited in cases in which a writ has been denied, but only on the
merits of the claim of error."' It was cited in what is probably still
the most accurate statement concerning superintending control
with respect to discovery:
We reaffirm the rule that the writ may not be utilized to infringe
upon or direct a trial court's discretion. . . . State ex rel. Norfolk
and Western Railway v. Dowd. . . . A presumption of right action

is afforded respondent, and relator has the burden of establishing
that respondent acted improperly. .

.

.Notwithstandingthe fore-

going principles, prohibition is the proper remedy where a trial
court has ordered discovery and such order "exceeds its jurisdiction" . . . or is an abuse of discretion. .... 174
When a discovery order provides access to evidence or information which is prohibited by the rules, or at least is not permitted by
them, desirability of interlocutory relief increases. This is illustrated
by State ex rel. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v.
Rickhoff175 and State ex rel. Benoit v. Randall.1 71 In State Farm the
Ford Motor Company was sued for damages resulting from an automobile collision allegedly caused by a defective Ford carburetor.
The defendant sought and obtained an order allowing the defendant
to inspect and test the carburetor-in Dearborn, Michigan. Ford did
not offer, and the court did not impose, any safeguards against
tampering with the carburetor. If the plaintiff could make out a
173. The supreme court has cited Dowd in a case in which it reviewed objections to
interrogatories on the merits. State ex rel. Deere & Co. v. Pinnell, 454 S.W.2d 889, 894 (Mo.
En Banc 1970). The treatment of Dowd by the court of appeals is also instructive. In State
ex rel. St. Louis Land Clearance for Redevelopment Authority v. Godfrey, 471 S.W.2d 938,
939 (St. L. Mo. App. 1971), Dowd was cited to support the issuance of a writ to prohibit the
imposition of an oppressive number of interrogatories. In State ex rel. Danforth v. Riley, 499
S.W.2d 40, 42 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1973), Dowd was cited as authority to support review of
orders compelling answers to interrogatories. See also note 174, infra.
174. State ex rel. Thomasville Wood Products, Inc. v. Buford, 512 S.W.2d 220, 221-22
(Mo. App., D. Spr. 1974) (emphasis added). The petition was to review a trial judge's order
to produce documents. The court issued the writ, because in its opinion, the documents would
not "tend to prove an issue as engendered by presently filed pleadings." Id. at 223.
175. 509 S.W.2d 485 (Mo. App.,D. St. L. 1974).
176. 431 S.W.2d 107 (Mo. En Banc 1968).

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1975

41

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 40, Iss. 4 [1975], Art. 1
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
[Vol. 40

submissible case, of course, the finder of fact would have reason to
discount any result of the carburetor test in Michigan that favored
Ford, so the removal of the carburetor by the defendant from the
protective custody of the plaintiff was not as serious as it may have
appeared. A more serious problem arose in Benoit, where a physician was suing other physicians for slander and conspiracy to reduce the plaintiff's hospital staff privileges. He sought to inspect
"all official hospital charts, including x-ray pictures, of all patients
admitted to Research Hospital" over a period of several years. The
trial court's grant of this request raised the issue of the physicianpatient privilege rather acutely. In neither case was any protective
order sought or issued. In both cases, the writ issued, and the court
of appeals suggested that a protective order might be sufficient to
withstand any subsequent objection to similar discovery orders.
Similar problems arise with respect to trade secrets, physical examinations, or membership lists. But, again, examination and use of
such information may be limited by a proper protective order, which
is itself subject to review.
Where prohibition of discovery involves only relative advantage
as between the parties, rather than privileged information or the
security of evidence, the importance of preventing unwarranted discovery is marginal. In the case of "work product," which by definition is not protected by the attorney-client privilege, the rules have
been amended to make such material discoverable on a showing
that the proponent "has substantial need of the materials in the
preparation of his case and that he is unable without undue hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials by other
means."'' The rule also requires that the use of such materials be
limited by protective orders. This change indicates a greater area
for discovery and for the use of trial judge discretion. Past performance of the appellate courts, however, indicates that the new rules
may actually increase the occasion for appellate court interference.
Now, not only may the issue whether something is "work product"
be reviewed, but so may the adequacy of the showing of "substantial
need," the availability of a "substantial equivalent," and the protective order!
Error in a discovery order that compels divulging privileged
information or endangers the security of evidence is hard to dismiss
as simply undeserving of interlocutory review. Such error is the
177.

Mo. Sup. CT. R. 56.01(b)(3).
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same as any committed in the judicial imposition of a disadvantage
which is not effectively reviewable after final judgment-e.g., interlocutory injunctions. The error was, however, committed in a manner which is presumably formally fair-i.e., where each opponent
has been afforded an adequate opportunity to be heard, for otherwise it may be so seriously wrong as to be within that class of
decisions which cannot be justified as the product of informed, rational, and fairly exercised judgment. In such cases, of course, a writ
is appropriate. If many arbitrary, erroneous decisions come from a
court, more direct action with respect to the issuer is called for, to
call attention to what is required of a judge. But where error in
issuing the discovery order is simply a matter of incorrectness, then
although provision for interlocutory appeal is justifiable, review by
writ is not.
The writ is even less justifiable when the discovery order arguably trenches on "work product" or where interrogatories may be
"vague" or "burdensome." In such cases it is not hard to resolve
doubts in favor of the trial judge's order, whether it grants or denies
discovery. The morals of the bar and the integrity of the attorneyclient relationship are not compromised by erroneous decision here,
nor is the burden imposed by "burdensome" or "vague" interrogatories sufficient to justify the delay and expense of exercising superintending control.
c. Irreversible Error
Some trial court error may alter a party's position in a way
which authorized appeal cannot correct. Usually this is because the
error is in an interlocutory order which is not subject to appellate
review. Sometimes, however, effective review is unavailable because
it is potentially .more harmful and expensive than is the trouble
caused by the alleged error. For example, if error in the denial or
dismissal of impleader were the basis for reversal, a plaintiff may
be required to retry a case he has already fairly won, for reasons that
relate solely to the claim by the defendant against a third person.
Superintending control will provide interlocutory review of such
error.17 By being denied an opportunity to implead, the defendant
has lost two advantages, neither of which is crucial to his remedy
against the third party.17 He has lost the convenience of a single
178. State ex rel. Laclede Gas Co. v. Godfrey, 468 S.W.2d 693 (St. L. Mo. App. 1971).
179. Impleader is not always a matter of right, and a perfectly good, unobjectionable
impleader may be refused in some cases. See Mo. SuP. CT. R. 52.11.
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proceeding for the resolution of interrelated liability questions, and
he has lost the assurance that the issue of damage will be decided
consistently as between plaintiff, defendant, and the third party
who may be liable to that defendant. It is no serious problem to
refuse to review most such error, unless it is assumed that without
the threat of interlocutory review trial judges will tend to err with
respect to the limits of third party practice.
In states that provide for interlocutory appeals, there usually
is review of interlocutory coercive orders, such as injunctions, restraining orders, and receiverships. 8 ' In Missouri, no such review of
interlocutory injunctions and temporary restraining orders is available. However, error in the issuance of coercive interlocutory orders
is often subject to collateral attack by prohibition, mandamus, or
habeas corpus.'"' Of course, the availability of collateral attack on
the enforcement of interlocutory coercive orders tends to make violation of those orders a less serious matter. This weakens the court's
authority and can provide an argument, albeit circular, for interlocutory review by the exercise of superintending control to preserve
that authority. But the availability of such interlocutory review is
a reason for the denial of habeas corpus relief, because the
opponent-violator has a chance to test the legality of the order. But
a cutback in habeas corpus would weaken the argument for the need
for superintending control. This gets us back to the main point: the
problem here is one of effective review, and nothing else. If this is
so, then the problem is properly referred to the agency in charge of
providing such review-the legislature.
Very few writs have issued to prevent enforcement of interlocutory injunctions or temporary restraining orders. The usual ground
for a writ has been the trial judge's failure to exact a bond as a
condition of granting interlocutory relief. A bond has been required
as a condition to interlocutory injunctions and temporary restraining orders since Missouri began to legislate for itself.'82 The modem
provision is slightly expanded, and excepts "suits instituted by the
state in its own behalf."'' 3 The exaction of a bond was first called
"jurisdictional" (at least to justify the issuance of a writ of prohibition) in State ex rel. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. v. Williams."s4 A circuit
180. See note 11 supra.
181. State ex rel. George v. Mitchell, 230 S.W.2d 116 (Spr. Mo. App. 1950).
182. Injunctions § 11, at 314, RSMo 1835.
183. § 526.070, RSMo 1969. The exemption for suits by the state first appeared in 1870.
Ch. 110, art. VII, § 11, RSMo 1872.
184. 221 Mo. 227, 120 S.W. 740 (En Banc 1909).
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attorney sued some railroads to prevent them from charging more
than a specified rate. The confiscatory nature of that rate was then
before a federal court in a suit by the railroads against the State of
Missouri. The railroads sought prohibition against further proceedings in the circuit court pending the outcome of the federal case,
and against enforcement of a preliminary injunction without the
requirement of a bond. Both prayers for prohibition were granted.
The authority for the "jurisdictional" nature of the bond requirement was City of St. Louis v. St. Louis Gaslight Co.,'85 in which the
court held that the opponent of a dissolved injunction could not
recover damages for injuries resulting from that injunction because
no bond had been filed. The only "jurisdictional" issue in the case
was the authority to award damages to the opponent of the injunction where the proponent had not filed a bond. The court discussed
the origin of the requirement of the bond in chancery practice to
show the necessity of a bond to the opponent's claim for damages,
not to the proponent's claim for an interlocutory injunction. However, it stated most obiter, a bond was now required by statute, and
the court cited the statute's mandatory language.
Subsequent appellate decisions included unnecessary statements concerning the jurisdictional nature of the bond requirement."'8 In one case," 7 the court became unusually careless in its
citations to authority, and cited section 1429 of High on Injunctions
which gave the proposition even less support than did St. Louis
Gaslight Co.:
[U]pon proceedings for contempt a defendant cannot escape liability for his disregard of the injunction upon the ground that the
185. 82 Mo. 349 (1884).
186. Akin v. Rice, 137 Mo. App. 147, 117 S.W. 655 (St. L. Ct. App. 1909); State ex tel.
Thrash v. Lamb, 237 Mo. 437, 141 S.W. 665 (En Banc 1911); State ex tel. Am. Bankers
Assurance Co. v. McQuillin, 260 Mo. 164, 168 S.W. 924 (En Banc 1914); Ex parte Gounis,
304 Mo. 428, 263 S.W. 988 (En Banc 1924); State ex tel. Becker v. Westhues, 286 S.W. 882
(Mo. En Banc 1926), which relied on Gounis; State ex tel. St. Ferdinand Sewer Dist. of St.
Louis County v. McElhinney, 330 Mo. 1063, 52 S.W.2d 400 (En Banc 1932), which relied on
Becker and on State ex tel. Missouri Pacific Ry. v. Williams, 221 Mo. 227, 120 S.W. 740 (En
Banc 1909). Gounis was the closest to the gate. There, the failure to require a bond was
treated as a ground for habeas corpus relief from contempt of a preliminary injunction. There
was no indication in the record as to whether a bond had been required, however, so the court
presumed that it had been, and rejected the ground. Reading the cases after Gounis is very
much like reading in the second edition of a textbook a statement the sole support for which

is a case which cites the same statement in the first edition of the textbook (for which there
was no real authority).
187. State ex tel. Am. Bankers Assurance Co. v. McQuillin, 260 Mo. 164,174,168 S.W.
924, 926 (En Banc 1914).
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court may have granted it without requiring a bond.' 8
Steady repetition of the "jurisdiction" language made it so entrenched that insufficiency of a bond became a ground for collateral
attack on a temporary injunction. In Ex parteDillon'9 suit had been
brought to determine title to land, and the defendants counterclaimed. The defendants demanded that the land be put into receivership, and that the plaintiffs and those claiming as tenants under
them be prevented from claiming the right to possession of the land
against the receiver. The receivership was established and a preliminary injunction issued as prayed by the defendants, but the bond
exacted from them did not name the tenants. The tenants refused
to move and were cited for contempt. Their commitment was attacked by habeas corpus on the ground that they were not protected
by a bond. The court held that the injunction was "void" and that
the trial court had no "jurisdiction" to issue the injunction without
requiring the bond."'
This is probably a case of overkill. The opponent of a temporary
injunction is certainly not precluded from waiving the bond requirement, although he might be if the requirement were a matter of
"jurisdiction." Moreover, the protection granted by the bond to the
opponent of a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction
is not deemed a matter of fundamental fairness in Missouri, because
it is not required in suits brought by the state on its own behalf. 19 '
The decision to grant a writ of habeas corpus may have been limited
at one time to cases in which the holding or committing authority
had no "jurisdiction." But now, "jurisdiction" is merely a screen
behind which a court may wish to hide its lack of publishable reasons for denying habeas corpus.'92 So the "jurisdictional" nature of
188. 2 J. HIGH, A TRsATISE ON THE LAW OF INJUNCTIONS § 1439 (1905).
189. 225 Mo. App. 280, 96 S.W.2d 1095 (K.C. Ct. App. 1936).
190. Cf. Curtis v. Tozer, 374 S.W.2d 557 (St. L. Mo. App. 1964). Demonstrators against
racially discriminatory hiring policies at a St. Louis bank were disrupting that bank's activities. A temporary restraining order naming specific persons and a group of persons was issued
and a bond was filed naming only the specific persons. Members of the group not named were
apparently not covered by the bond, but the court of appeals held this an inadequate ground
of objection to citation for contempt. Dillon was distinguished.
191. § 526.070, RSMo 1969. Inadequacy of the bond may be as serious a defect in the
protection of the opponent of the interlocutory injunction as is the absence of a bond. So far,
the writ has not gone to correct such inadequacy. Apparently, the discretion of the trial judge
with respect to the amount of the bond is extremely broad and effectively insulated from
review. See Crackerneck Country Club, Inc. v. Sprinkle, 485 S.W.2d 652 (Mo. App., D.K.C.
1972),
192. Osborn v. Owsley, 259 S.W.2d 129 (K.C. Mo. App. 1953). In In re F.C., 484 S.W.2d
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the bond was probably unnecessary to the court's decision to grant
habeas corpus. All this points to the similarity between error with
respect to the bond requirement and any other error with respect to
the grant or denial of interlocutory relief. Each is simply a matter
for whatever appellate review is available. The only difference between such error and any other error is the inadequacy of appellate
review-traditionally insufficient to support either mandamus or
prohibition.
d. Will Any Error Do?
Thus far, no claim of error which has been committed during

trial has been remedied by writ. The major reason for this is probably that none has yet been sought to correct such error. Otherwise,

almost any error will do, even if it is or amounts to a final judgment.
Denial of intervention, whether of right or permissive, is a final
judgment, reviewable by appeal.'9 3 It has also been reviewed by

superintending control.'94 Nearly all error that is effectively reviewable on appeal is curable by writ as well. Denial of a motion to

dismiss impleader, 95 like denial of a motion to dismiss a petition for
failure to state a cause of action, has been given immediate superin-

tending attention. So has joinder or refusal to join parties and
claims.198 In all these cases, of course, the issue would come up and

be curable in the normal course of appellate review if the movant
loses at trial, and otherwise the likelihood is that no review is
needed.
21 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1972), it was conceded that the defect that was the ground for habeas
corpus was not jurisdictional, although it was so called to justify the writ.
193. Ratermann v. Ratermann Realty & Inv. Co., 341 S.W.2d 280 (St. L. Mo. App.
1960), limited appeals from denials of permissive intervention to cases of plain abuse of
discretion. That combines grounds for appeal with grounds for reversal. See City of St. Louis
v. Silk, 239 Mo. App. 757, 199 S.W.2d 23 (St. L. Ct. App. 1947); State ex rel. State Highway
Comm'n v. Hudspeth, 303 S.W.2d 703 (St. L. Mo. App. 1957).
194. State ex rel. Imperial Utility Corp. v. Hess, 514 S.W.2d 645 (Mo. App., D. St. L.
1974).
195. State ex reL. Junior College Dist. of St. Louis v. Godfrey, 465 S.W.2d 1 (St. L. Mo.
App. 1971).
196. State ex rel. Siegel v. Strother, 365 Mo. 861, 289 S.W.2d 73 (En Banc 1956); State
ex reL. Knight Oil Co. v. Vardeman, 409 S.W.2d 672 (Mo. En Banc 1966); State ex rel.
Farmers Ins. Co. v. Murphy, 518 S.W.2d 655 (Mo. En Banc 1975); State ex rel. Safeco Ins.
Co. of America v. Scott, 521 S.W.2d 448 (Mo. En Banc 1975); State ex rel. Gulf Oil Corp. v.
Weinstein, 379 S.W.2d 172 (St. L. Mo. App. 1964). In State ex rel. Keeling v. Randall, 386
S.W.2d 67 (Mo. En Banc 1964), the trial court ordered two cases consolidated, and then
allowed the plaintiff in one of them to dismiss. Conceding his authority to sever the cases,
the supreme court nevertheless said he could not allow the dismissal.
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Substantive defenses have also been matters for superintending
control. An order dismissing or refusing to dismiss all or part of a
case can be subject to superintending control.'97 So can an order
striking an affirmative defense,'98 a claim for punitive damages,19 an
excessive claim for damages,100 or a cross claim. 0 1 Error may be in
2 3
the application of local law, 02 or in choice-of-law.

197. For some reason, the defense of res judicata has not been sufficiently "jurisdictional" to join other defenses as ground for a writ, State ex rel. Green v. Kimberlin, 517
S.W.2d 124 (Mo. En Banc 1974), unless it was wrongly applied to deny a cross claim, State
ex rel Ward v. Stubbs, 374 S.W.2d 40 (Mo. En Banc 1964). The court in Green made the
statement, somewhat odd in light of the following cases, that:
The decision of issues arising on the merits is peculiarly within the jurisdiction and
power of the inferior court. It may decide the issues erroneously if it will. To say
that the inferior court has jurisdiction to decide an issue and has no jurisdiction to
decide it erroneously is a paradox.
517 S.W.2d at 129. As to paradoxes, the following defenses have been given special treatment
by writ: (1) Failure to state a cause of action. See note 127 supra. (2) Want of "equity
jurisdiction," which is much the same thing. State ex reL. Cervantes v. Bloom, 485 S.W.2d
446 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1972) (failure to state grounds for injunction); State ex rel. Phillips
v. Yeaman, 451 S.W.2d 115 (Mo. En Banc 1970) (adequacy of legal remedy). (3) Want of
standing and improper cause of action. State ex reL Cooper v. Cloyd, 461 S.W.2d 833 (Mo.
En Banc 1971) (standing to contest a will); State ex rel. Schneider's Credit Jewelers, Inc. v.
Brackman, 272 S.W.2d 289 (Mo. En Banc 1954) (want of standing to bring quo warranto).
(4) Immunity of the defendant. State ex rel. Eagleton v. Hall, 389 S.W.2d 798 (Mo. En Banc
1965) (where a phantom problem effectively blocked any contest as to a bequest to the state).
(5) Unconstitutionality of the statute under which the claim arises. State ex reL Rogers v.
Kirtley, 372 S.W.2d 86 (Mo. En Banc 1963) (federal Constitution); State ex rel. Public Water
Supply Dist. No. 7 v. James, 237 S.W.2d 113 (Mo. En Banc 1951) (state constitution). (6)
Statute of limitations. State ex rel. Lumbermen's Casualty Co. v. Stubbs, 471 S.W.2d 268
(Mo. En Banc 1971). (7) Statute of Frauds. State ex reL Uthoff v. Russell, 210 S.W.2d 1017
(St. L. Mo. App. 1948). (8) Election of remedies, considered insufficient to justify such review
by the supreme court in State ex rel. Kansas City v. Harris, 212 S.W.2d 733 (Mo. En Banc
1948), was perfectly sufficient for a court of appeals in State ex rel. Hilleary and Partners,
Ltd, v. Kelly, 448 S.W.2d 926 (St. L. Mo. App. 1969). (9) Want of notice under a statute which
provides the cause of action. State ex rel Goodenough v. Turpin, 487 S.W.2d 876 (Mo. App.,
D. St. L. 1972) (even if it is a matter committed by that statute to the trial judge's discretion);
State ex rel. Schoenfelder v. Owen, 347 Mo. 1131, 152 S.W.2d 60 (1941).
198. State ex reL Pulliam v. Swink, 514 S.W.2d 559 (Mo. En Banc 1974).
199. State ex rel. Smith v. Greene, 494 S.W.2d 55 (Mo. En Banc 1973).
200. State ex rel Ellis v. Stussie, 515 S.W.2d 411 (Mo. En Banc 1974); State ex reL
St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. v. Buder, 515 S.W.2d 409 (Mo. En Banc 1974).
201. State ex rel. Ward v. Stubbs, 374 S.W.2d 40 (Mo. En Banc 1964).
202, In State ex rel. Reis v. Nangle, 349 S.W.2d 508 (St. L. Mo. App. 1961), a court
refused to hear and decide claims which, it held, were not properly before it. The court of
appeals granted a writ because, no matter who won, the case would be appealed and sent
back for another trial and perhaps another appeal. This means that the striking of a claim
for relief, or an affirmative defense, or an item of damage, or the grant of partial summary
judgment ought to be subject to treatment by writ, too.
203. See State ex rel. Broglin v. Nangle, 510 S.W.2d 699 (Mo. En Banc 1974); State ex
rel. McCubbin v. McMillian, 349 S.W.2d 453 (St. L. Mo. App. 1961).
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What is left? The cases seem to suggest that there are only two
differences between the exercise of superintending control and appellate jurisdiction: a purely formal distinction in terms of the nominal respondent and the form of relief,2" 4 and the discretionary nature of superintending control. If that is all, refusal to exercise appellate jurisdiction because of the limitations placed on the court's
authority by the final judgment rule is at best incompletely explained, and at worst somewhat hypocritical.
V.

CONCLUSION

Inadequacy of statistics with respect to the annual workload of
Missouri appellate courts makes it impossible to state with any
certainty the degree to which current practice in the exercise of
superintending control contributes to that workload. The total burden of the appellate courts is increasing. The St. Louis district of
the court of appeals is literally bursting at the seams. The regular
appellate workload is uncontrollable, because appeal is of right and
disposition must be by opinion." 5 The contribution of superintending control to the appellate court's burden is controllable. Most
petitions for the exercise of superintending control are summarily
denied shortly after submission, but only after considerable judicial
time has been consumed in evaluating them. Many petitions are
denied after substantial argument by brief and motion, and others
are mooted by changed circumstances, including compliance by the
respondent judge with the relator's demand. In a very small number
of cases, a published opinion accompanies the grant or denial of
final relief. The substantial number of opinions in this area, then,
should suggest that the contribution of the current exercise of superintending authority has a considerable impact on the workload of
the appellate courts.
Is the writ business worth the cost? One way to answer this
question is to look at the kind of error that writs have issued to cure.
The lack of statistics leaves much to impression, but whether the
frame of reference is the last five, fifty, or one hundred years, the
proportion seems to be about the same: by far the largest number
of writs issued to cure error that was curable by subsequent events
at trial or by appeal. Rarely was it clear whether cure by writ would
204. See note 55 supra.
205. The "transfer" jurisdiction of the supreme court is also uncontrollable, in part. See
Mo. CoNST. art. V, § 10.
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obviate appeal or retrial. A very small portion of all writs went to
cure error that was effectively insulated from appellate review-interlocutory coercive orders, dismissals for want of jurisdiction over the person, etc. A miniscule portion of all writs related to
truly jurisdictional matters as to which the appellate remedy was
arguably inadequate.
It is easy to wonder why appellate courts have allowed superintending control to become a relatively unlimited, discretionary appellate device. In part, the answer may lie in dissatisfaction with
present appellate opportunities available to the parties. But the
constitutional role of the judiciary is not to provide appellate review
where the legislature has provided none. If the fault lies in the
interpretation of statutes governing appeal, the cure is in the judiciary, unless the fiction of "legislative acquiescence by silence" is
sufficient to deter the cure. A different question would arise if state
or federal constitutional requirements included a requirement that
appeal be available. But there is no such requirement. Nor does
tradition provide any authority for justifying the exercise of superintending control because of an inadequate appellate remedy. Perhaps part of the reason for current practice with regard to writs is
the laudable desire that justice be done now. But implicit in this is
an assumption that an incorrect decision is always an unjust one.
If a solution is desired, it might be found in the functional
distinction between appellate and superintending functions, which
broadly limits the latter to the administration of the judicial system. That is, superintending control relates to the proper operation
of the system as a dispute-settling, justice-dispensing system, to the
relationship between the parts of that system, and to the relationship between the judiciary and other organs of government. The
correctness of decision-making, whether with regard to the rights of
the parties, the authority of a court to grant or deny access, or a
remedy, would be excluded except insofar as it implicated the limits
imposed on the judicial system with respect to other organs of government, or the limits imposed on parts of the judicial system with
respect to other parts of that system. A superintending court which
desires to take such a view might adopt a set of criteria which are
based upon old formulae concerning the issuance of writs. For example: No writ will issue to correct trial court error unless there is
clearly no adequate remedy by appeal or by procedures in the trial
court, and unless the error is either (1) transgression of jurisdictional
lines between courts or between courts and other government or-
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gans, or (2) a matter concerning the administration of the judicial
system relating to the operation of a court or the prevention of
conflict between courts. An exception may be made by the supreme
court where the issue raised by the petition is of great public importance, and is especially needy of quick judicial settlement.
These criteria could be adopted by the supreme court for the
whole judicial system (as an exercise of superintending control) or
they could be adopted by each district of the court of appeals. In
the latter case, of course, the exception for cases of great public
importance could be retained by a standard practice of summary
denial of such writs, which would immediately direct the petitioner
to the supreme court.
It could be objected that the adoption of such criteria amounts
to a refusal in advance to perform a ministerial duty-to-wit:
individual exercise of discretion with respect to each petition for a
writ. However, the limitation and definition of judicial discretion is
normally a judicial function. Such limitation is usually a matter of
choice, not of compulsion by clear constitutional or statutory mandate. Classes of cases have been excluded from the courts by judicial
decree, because, as a matter of policy, such cases raise issues that
are better raised in another form, or that ought rather to be decided
by other organs of government (or by no organ of government). It
should not be hard to justify limitation of superintending control by
criteria that are drawn from traditional formulae governing the issuance of mandamus and prohibition, and which are based on deference to the constitutional role of the General Assembly in the regulation of appellate jurisdiction. Moreover, it is normally conceded
that concern for appellate workload, without anything else, will
justify summary denial of a meritorious petition for superintending
relief. Surely a general concern for the workload of the superintending courts would justify a general rule that limits the writ to only
the easiest cases for such relief.
There is one innovation in the proposed criteria-the requirement that remedies in the trial court be exhausted before superintending relief is sought. The support for such a requirement comes
from rules that limit the grant of extraordinary relief to cases where
other relief is not realistically available, and rules that give the trial
court one last chance to correct its own error before the error is
reviewable by an appellate court. There is no strong reason for a
superintending court to involve itself in time-consuming and expensive interlocutory review when the petitioner has not made a good
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faith effort to obtain relief from the trial court.
Early decisions support the statement that appeal is always
adequate unless the claimed error has substantial effect which is
immune from appellate reversal. If the effect of error may be vitiated by subsequent events at trial or on appeal, there is no inadequacy of appellate or other remedy. Perhaps if the error will vitiate
trial, no matter who wins, appeal is inadequate. But even then, the
party raising the issue by writ will have raised it in the trial court
and the decision upholding jurisdiction usually will be protected by
res judicata if there is no appeal.
Although it is not necessary to repeat the kinds of error that
ought to invite the writ under the proposed criteria, it may be useful
to note that such error is not limited to "jurisdictional" or "ministerial" matters in the narrow sense, and that it does not include all
error with respect to judicial authority. Clear grounds for reversal
and retrial are not, themselves, grounds for the exercise of superintending control unless the error is so gross and easily spotted as to
amount to a refusal by the judge to act-to act in a fair, rational,
and informed manner. The public urgency exception is designed for
the hasty counsel who could have had an appeal had he waited a
day, but applied for a writ instead. There should be extremely few
gross error and public urgency cases-probably no more than one or
two per year. More than that should indicate laxity in the enforcement of the criteria.
No matter what the ground, a writ should not issue if it will
interrupt trial. The costs in time are simply too great, and the time
for appeal is probably close enough.
These criteria insulate some trial court error from appellate
review. Interlocutory coercive orders with immediate effect-e.g.,
preliminary injunctions and some discovery orders, remain in the
hands of the trial judge unless the General Assembly is willing to
increase the work of the appellate courts (and, one hopes, provide
the resources to handle the work). Of course, in the extremely rare
case of gross error described above, such error can be reviewed by
writ, where there is no effective appellate review.
Adoption and enforcement of the criteria will not prevent counsel from seeking to circumvent them or from causing delay by frivolous application for superintending control. There will still be petitions that allege that a trial court has no jurisdiction to commit
error-e.g., in overruling a motion to dismiss for failure to state a
claim, or striking a claim or defense, or ordering or refusing to order
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answers to "vague" or "burdensome" interrogatories. The petitioner
will normally assert that appeal is inadequate because it comes after
trial, or because it takes too much time, or because a supersedeas
bond must be filed for the protection of the appellee-that is, if the
petitioner loses the case at trial. In such cases, at least the true
opponent of the writ should be protected from the cost and vexation
imposed by opposing the petition. There are two ways this protection might be afforded. First, the denial of the writ might be accompanied by directions to the trial judge that counsel fees and other
costs allocable to opposition to the petition for a writ be awarded
at the end of trial. The award of counsel fees is disfavored in the law,
but there is some authority, which might be stretched just a little
to fit this case, that where the result of wrongful conduct "is to
involve the wronged party in collateral litigation, reasonable attorneys' fees necessarily and in good faith incurred in protecting himself from the injurious consequences thereof are proper items of
damages." ' 6 The second possibility, in line with old chancery practice which protected the opponent of coercive orders, is to require
that the petitioner file a bond with his petition to assure the real
opponent (and perhaps the appellate court) compensation for time
and expense if the petition is not within the criteria or is substantively frivolous. Ultimately, it is up to the self-control of the appellate judges themselves if the waste of judicial resources occasioned
by current superintending practice is to be halted.
206. Johnson v. Mercantile Trust Co. Nat'l Ass'n, 510 S.W.2d 33, 40 (Mo. 1974). The
counsel fees awarded were incurred in a separate lawsuit. The plaintiff had to litigate as a
result of the wrong of the defendant in this case. See also State ex rel. Moore v. Morant, 266
S.W.2d 723 (St. L. Mo. App. 1954).
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